

Running on Faith?

A Quantitative Analysis of the Effect of Religious Cleavages on the Intensity and Duration of Internal Conflicts

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- *We know of no people without names, no languages or cultures in which some manner of distinctions between self and other, we and they, are not made* (Calhoun 1994: 9).

ABSTRACT

Although the relationship between religion and violent internal conflict is increasingly studied in the civil war literature, previous studies largely focus on factors influencing the onset of armed conflict. This thesis examines the less analyzed aspects of conflict intensity and duration. More specifically, it examines how these aspects are influenced by the presence of identity-based religious cleavages. By applying a theoretical perspective novel to the religion-conflict nexus, the thesis seeks to provide theoretical knowledge on how faith affects conflict dynamics. Concerning intensity, it is argued that religion, as a basis for identity and organized around a common belief-system and common doctrine, relaxes intragroup problems and makes it easier for belligerents to mobilize. Regarding duration, it is proposed that religious cleavages make it harder for the parties to establish the intergroup trust needed to reach stable peace agreements. Through extensive data collection a new indicator is introduced, measuring the presence of identity-based religious cleavages in 241 intrastate conflicts in the period 1946-2004. Results show that religious conflicts, as defined, are significantly more intense than non-religious ones. Furthermore, the analysis reveals an ambiguous impact on duration. In early stages religious conflicts are more likely than others to be terminated, whereas conflicts that have lasted at least two and half years are less likely to be terminated if they involve a religious cleavage.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword
(The Holy Bible 1962: Matthew 10:34).

Violent internal conflicts¹ have been raging across the globe throughout the whole post-World War II period. These conflicts have been fought in almost every corner of the world. With the end of the Cold War they have received increasing attention from both scholars and policy makers. Despite a large greed or grievance debate (Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Berdal & Malone 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; de Soysa 2002) and a focus on ethnic factors (Brubaker & Laitin 1998; Ellingsen 2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2001), religion has received much attention the later years. This thesis applies a new indicator measuring the presence of identity-based religious cleavages in civil wars in the period 1946-2004. Further, this indicator is used in analyses of conflict intensity and duration. Although most research on internal conflicts has focused on their onset, during the last decade researchers have started to focus more on other aspects of conflict dynamics, including intensity and duration. Some conflicts are terminated after only a few days while others last several decades. Whereas some kill only a few handfuls of people, others kill tens of thousands. What can explain these differing conflict dynamics?

Recently the region of North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been stricken by a wave of violence. The rebel leader, Laurent Nkunda, a Pentecostal pastor, claims to fight in the name of God. ‘That is what I tell my troops. When they fight, they have God on their side’ (Nkunda cited in Wen 2007). Nkunda is not unique in this regard. Faith is regularly connected to violence and civil war. Consider the case of Sri Lanka where a protracted conflict between the Sinhalese government and the Tamil rebels in Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been fought since 1983. The conflict is originally secessionist, but includes a religious cleavage as the Sinhalese are predominantly Buddhist while Tamils are predominantly Hindu. Religion has contributed to the conflict in various ways. Although Buddhism is known to be a peaceful religion, the role of some Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka has been quite

¹ In the following, the terms ‘internal conflict’, ‘intrastate conflict’, and ‘civil war’ are used interchangeably.

contrary. Iselin Frydenlund (2005) has noted the violent sentiments among some Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka and how religious agitation has been used to fuel the conflict. Although not all monks are militant in character, it is common for all to decorate offices and temple halls with pictures showing themselves with army generals and 'it is customary for Buddhist monks to bless the army' (*ibid.*: 18). These actions and statements obviously contribute to legitimize the army's actions against the insurgents and may increase conflict intensity. In addition, Buddhist monks have opposed several peace attempts, contributing to the breakdown of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact in 1957 and the Senanayake-Chelvanayagam Pact in 1965 (*ibid.*: 18-19).

Is it reasonable to discuss religion in connection with violent conflict? Is religion even a salient issue in our time? Modernization and secularization theory, thriving in the 1950s and 1960s, predicted the demise of religion. Modernization theorists expected processes of economic development, urbanization, growing enrolment and literacy rates, and technological advancements should leave people without a need for 'primordial factors' like religion in politics (Fox 2004c: 716). Similarly, secularization theory posited 'the demise of religion, which is to be replaced by secular, rational, and scientific phenomena' (*ibid.*). As an implication religion should not be important, neither to individuals nor groups. Religion should not be a relevant conflict cleavage and, if it is, conflicts with a religious cleavage should not differ significantly from conflicts without such a cleavage. An opposing view is proposed by Samuel Huntington (1993, 2002) who forecasted that civilizational identities would come to the forefront after the end of the Cold War. These identities are based on several cultural factors, but religion holds a special position (Huntington 2002: 47). Huntington interprets the effects of modernization very differently from theorists of the modernization school. According to him, people who move to the city and become separated from their roots turn to religion as a source of identity, stable community and moral precepts (*ibid.*: 97). Civilizational divides consequently become more pronounced, leading to fault line wars where civilizations meet.

Although it is premature to conclude whether Huntington was right, it seems safe to say that theories of modernization and secularization were wrong. In fact,

scientists have identified a resurgence of religion (Emerson & Hartman 2006; Huntington 2002; Juergensmeyer 1995; Larsson 2002; Marty & Appleby 1991; Norris & Inglehart 2004; Tehranian 2007; Thomas 2007). The religious resurgence is said to have increased the degree of religiosity (Juergensmeyer 1995: 57), fundamentalism (Marty & Appleby 1991: 620), and the salience of religious issues and movements (Larsson 2002: 48). According to Majid Tehranian, the resurgence can be seen in both richer and poorer countries. In richer countries, he regards the resurgence to be a consequence of the modernization process, leading to ‘intense yearning for meaning, identity and community’ (Tehranian 2007: 392), an interpretation Huntington probably would agree on. In poorer countries, Tehranian interprets it as a part of the struggle against globalization and colonization, thus a cultural response (*ibid.*).

Religious differences will here be considered as a possible explanation of high intensity levels and prolongation of conflict. Is there a statistical relationship? Does faith impact on conflict dynamics in general or merely in a few exceptions? I will not enter into the discussion around whether or not civil wars are fought over faith *per se*, but rather put forward the argument that religious cleavages, defined as different religious affiliations, can affect people’s willingness to fight, making conflicts more violent, and at the same time make it harder for belligerents to establish intergroup trust, making conflicts more protracted.

This thesis has two main purposes. First, it presents a theoretical framework intended to improve the understanding of how faith can influence conflict dynamics and make conflicts bloodier and longer-lasting. Second, I analyze statistically whether and how religion influences intrastate conflicts empirically. Is there a significant statistical relationship? The research question is the following: *In what direction and to what degree do religious cleavages influence the intensity and duration of internal conflicts?*

This question is answered quantitatively through multivariate regressions. For the intensity analysis, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is applied in an analysis of 1,035 conflict-years. Duration is analyzed through Cox regression, a form of survival analysis. The units for this analysis are 241 conflicts. Findings indicate that conflicts with a religious cleavage are significantly more violent than conflicts with no

such cleavage. The impact on duration is ambiguous; the presence of a religious cleavage tends to increase prospects for termination in early phases, but having lasted two and a half years, religious conflicts are harder to end than non-religious ones. Moreover, other aspects of faith – more specifically religious discrimination, legitimacy, and demography – are shown to be significant predictors of intensity and duration in religious conflict.

King *et al.* (1994:15) have proposed two criteria for scientific research. First, all research should pose a question of importance to the real world. What makes civil wars important? Violent conflicts have vast social and human costs, and a society's cost of violence can be seen as a function of its intensity and duration. Civil wars cause tremendous suffering. The most obvious cost is the loss of life. Deaths are a direct consequence of violence, on the battle field, and they occur indirectly through disease and malnutrition. Hoeffler & Reynal-Querol (2003) have shown that those who suffer the most are civilians. There has been a relative increase in civilian deaths in violent conflict, from 10 percent of all casualties at the beginning of the 20th century to nearly 90 percent in the 1990s (Collier *et al.* 2003: 17). Moreover, survivors may become maimed, injured, and ill as they are exposed to riskier conditions and government capacity to provide health service is reduced (*ibid.*: 26). Furthermore, civil violence cause flows of refugees as frightened people are forced to flee from their homes and possessions. By the end of 2006, there were nearly 15 million refugees² and 12.8 million internally displaced persons in the world (UNHCR 2007: 7). On top of these figures, there were additional millions of repatriated refugees, asylum-seekers, and others. In total, 32.9 million people were of concern to UNHCR in 2006, a 54 per cent increase from the previous year (*ibid.*: 23).

Violent conflicts also have adverse economic effects. Economic costs occur as resources are diverted from production and allocated to destructive activities (Collier *et al.* 2003: 13). Productivity suffers as GDP, food production and exports fall (Stewart *et al.* 2001: 75-81). Detrimental activities like the destruction of infrastructure, looting, and rampaging inflict damage on all levels, and these adverse consequences are not

² This figure includes 4.4 million Palestinian refugees not counted as regular refugees by UNHCR (UNHCR 2007: 16).

confined to the period of conflict. Collier *et al.* (2003: 20-21) have shown how military expenditures, capital flight and social capital are affected for another decade after the killing has stopped. These adverse consequences, both human and economic, are arguably more severe in intense and long-lasting conflicts.

This project also fulfils the other of King and associates' criteria, that each research project should 'make a contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world' (King *et al.* 1994: 15). Following the religious resurgence, researchers of conflict have increasingly focused on religion. Quantitative examples are Ellingsen (2005), Fox (2000b, 2004b, 2004c, 2007b), Fox & Squires (2001), Nordås (2004a, 2004b, 2007), Pearce (2005), Reynal-Querol (2002), and Svensson (2007a). This study's contribution to the research area is threefold. First, it applies a theoretical framework which has not (to the author's knowledge) been applied to studies of religious conflict in the past. Second, through extensive data collection a new indicator is introduced, measuring the presence of identity-based religious cleavages in 241 intrastate conflicts in the period 1946-2004. Finally, as few studies have examined intensity and duration for this whole period – and none (to the author's knowledge) using the methods of analysis applied here – the findings reached here will provide further leverage to the field of research.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Following this introduction, chapter 2 reviews relevant findings in the existing literature on conflict intensity and duration. Chapter 3 develops an analytical framework, separating problems *within* groups from those *between* groups. Further, it discusses how a religious cleavage can help groups overcome intragroup problems and at the same time reinforce intergroup problems. This chapter also states hypotheses that are to be tested in subsequent analyses. In chapter 4 the research design is presented, before variable operationalizations are discussed. Chapter 5 reports the results from the analyses and discusses how these can be interpreted, reflecting on the stated hypotheses. Finally, chapter 6 concludes this study and suggests some policy implications and directions for future research.

1.1 Defining central terms

A few important terms should be defined introductorily. The term ‘internal conflict’ is used in different ways by different scholars. Quantitative studies typically investigate only violent conflicts, whereas qualitative research frequently report non-violent ones as well. Non-violent conflicts differ profoundly from violent ones and it is much harder to identify their relevant cleavages, duration and the level of intensity. For this reason, I do not consider non-violent conflict in this study. Still, violent conflicts are not all the same. Different definitions use different thresholds regarding violence. One of the most frequently used datasets, from the Correlates of War (COW) project, operates with 1,000 battle-related deaths (Sarkees 2000; Singer & Small 1972, 1994; Small & Singer 1982). The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, on the other hand, uses a threshold of 25 battle-deaths (Gleditsch *et al.* 2002). In this case a low threshold is most expedient. The reason is threefold. First, it is intuitively reasonable. A higher threshold would exclude incidents like the lengthy, low-intensity conflicts of País Vasco and Northern Ireland. In the latter case, the criterion of 25 deaths was satisfied every year in the period 1971-93, without reaching 1,000 deaths in any single year in the period (*ibid.*: 617). Second, it allows for more cases, hence increasing the possibility for statistically significant results (*ibid.*). Third, it allows for a variety of intensity levels, thus minimizing problems of selection bias. For an analysis of intensity this is necessary. It is also advantageous for duration, as conflicts are regarded as terminated if they dip below the threshold. Choosing a threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths would omit important information, and could lead to misleading inferences.³

The UCDP/PRIO definition of conflict will be applied. Here, an armed conflict is ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’ (*ibid.*: 618-619). Internal conflict is a subtype of conflict which ‘occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups’ (*ibid.*: 619).⁴ This excludes one-sided violence (for instance state-sponsored violence against a passive adversary) and

³ For more on selection bias, see section 4.2.1.

⁴ I include both internationalized and non-internationalized internal conflicts in my data.

communal violence (between two or more non-state actors). Conflict intensity is here used in the meaning of annual battle-related deaths, while duration is the temporal range between onset (when the above criteria are first fulfilled) and termination (when they first cease to be fulfilled). A restarted war counts as a new one.

The state is important in the definition of conflict. Following Gleditsch and associates I define a state as ‘an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or a non-recognized government whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory’ (*ibid.*).

Defining religion can be a hard task, and scientists of religion do not agree upon a standard definition. In fact, a century ago James Leuba, an American psychologist, counted forty-eight different ways to define the term (Gilhus & Mikaelsson 2001: 23). Religions can at least be said to be elements of complex cultural systems (Rothstein & Warmind 2000: 8). The concept can be thought of in functional or substantial terms. The latter refers to what religion is and what it comprises, while the former focuses on what it does (*ibid.*). Another distinction is between the individual and the collective. Kværne & Vogt (2002: 309) are of the opinion that a religion is not complete without a community. In the following, religion is used in collective and functional terms. As a working definition I will apply that of Fox & Sandler, focusing on five dimensions. According to them religion, first, is a basis for identity, second, includes a belief-system influencing individual behaviour, third, includes religious doctrine or theology, also assumed to influence behaviour, fourth, is a source of legitimacy, and, fifth, is associated with religious institutions (Fox & Sandler 2005: 294-295).

What then constitutes a religious conflict? Cleavages may be identity-based or issue-based. Identity-based cleavages exist where the conflicting parties adhere to different religious traditions, for instance where one group is predominantly Muslim and the other Christian or where one is Protestant and the other Catholic. Issue-based cleavages occur where religion is a central incompatibility between the groups (Nordås 2007: 9). I will apply an identity-based distinction, and conflicts with an identity-based religious cleavage are referred to as religious conflicts.⁵

⁵ For more on the definition of religious cleavages, see section 4.3.3.

As identity is central to definition of religion, this term should be clarified as well. Hardin (1995) distinguishes between identity and identification. Identity, according to Hardin is an objective measure, based on objective qualities such as race or gender. Identification, on the other hand, is subjective, entailing certain commitments and motivations (*ibid.*: 6-7). Identity is thus an exogenously based quality, while identification is endogenous. Turning to collective identity, there is no single consensual definition. Nevertheless, for a crowd to recognize themselves, or to be recognized by others, as a group, they need ‘a shared sense of “one-ness” or “we-ness” anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of “others”’ (Snow 2001: 4). Thus, both of Hardin’s notions are of relevance to collective identities. Identities in the objective sense, those attributed to somebody by others, are important as they are used to label others. Without this kind of objective identity, in- and out-groups cannot be established. However, for in- and out-groups to be important, people must identify with them, subjectively. Only then can these groups provide individuals with commitment and motivation.

2 PREVIOUS FINDINGS

The reward of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive to create disorder in the land is only this that they be slain or crucified or their hands and their feet be cut off on alternate sides, or they be expelled from the land. That shall be a disgrace for them in the world, and in the Hereafter they shall have a great punishment (The Holy Qur'ān 1965: 5:33).

There is an extensive and growing civil war literature. Most of the literature has focused on conflict onset and means to avoid the outbreak of violent conflict. Still, in recent years the civil war literature has expanded into the fields of intensity and duration. This chapter briefly summarizes main findings. It starts off with an examination of intensity and proceeds to explore previous studies of duration.

A few factors are repeatedly found to be statistically significant. One of these is regime type. A recent study focusing on political institutions finds a highly significant negative effect from democracy, meaning conflicts are less violent in democratic countries than in autocracies (Gleditsch *et al.* forthcoming). The same calming impact from democracy is found by Lacina (2006) and Nordås (2007). The level of development is commonly included, but is found non-significant in most studies. Still, Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming) find this variable to be significant at the 1% level, predicting lower intensity levels in high-income countries. Among cultural factors, indicators of ethnic demography are frequently incorporated. Ethnic fractionalization is found by Fox (2004c) to increase intensity levels, whereas Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming) find a non-linear, bell-shaped relationship. Looking into another demographic aspect, Lacina (2006) finds ethnic polarization to predict significantly lower intensity levels. Replicating Lacina's analysis, Nordås (2007) finds that ethnic polarization falls short of statistical significance, whereas religious polarization, non-significant in Lacina's study, returns significant and positive, indicating more fatalities in religiously polarized countries.⁶ Considering other factors, Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming) finds conflicts in oil exporting countries to predict significantly more

⁶ The different findings can result from changes over time (Nordås examines the period 1989-2005 while Lacina includes 1946-2002) or differences between small and larger conflicts (Lacina limits her study to conflicts that reach a total of 900 battle-related deaths, whereas Nordås examines all conflicts satisfying the UCDP/PRIO criteria of 25 annual battle-deaths).

battle-deaths than other conflicts. Furthermore, a lagged variable measuring intensity in previous conflict years is significant and positive (*ibid.*).

There have also been studies looking into religious identities. Following Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory, Philip Roeder (2003) has examined whether or not civilizational conflicts are more intense than other conflicts using logit analysis. Defining a civilizational conflict as one where 'the dominant religion of the ethnic group belongs to a different civilization than that of the majority of the country's population' (*ibid.*: 516), his logistical model finds conflicts with a civilizational divide to have significantly higher levels of intensity. This result is supported by Andrej Tuscisny (2004: 494-495) whose logistic regression indicate that civilizational conflicts are more violent than non-civilizational ones, although only in the post-Cold War period. Other studies have focused more explicitly on religion. Using a t-test, Jonathan Fox (2004b) finds that conflicts with religious differences predict more fatalities than conflicts without such differences. In another study he finds that religious conflicts have been more intense than non-religious ones ever since the middle of the 1960s; however, the differences were only statistically significant between 1975 and 1994 (Fox 2004c: 726). Susanna Pearce (2005) has analyzed conflict intensity through a chi square test. Results show that conflicts where belligerents belong to different religious traditions tend to be more intense than other conflicts ($p=0.102$). It should, however, be noted that the share of high-intensity conflicts was higher among non-religious conflicts than religious conflicts. The result was a consequence of a relatively low share of low-intensity conflicts and a high share of moderate-intensity conflicts among those with religious differences (*ibid.*: 342). The relationship is more pronounced, although still weak, when the relevance of religion to the conflict is incorporated (*ibid.*: 344-345). Ragnhild Nordås looks at several faith-based variables in relation to conflict severity, defined as 'the total battle deaths over the course of fighting' (Nordås 2007: 12). Performing a linear regression she finds that religion – identity-based, issue-based, or regarding religious rhetoric – contributes little to variations in intensity. However, as she controls for duration there is a chance that this obscures other impacts. Religion might influence duration and thus have an indirect effect on severity.

What about duration? Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming) have looked into the effect of political institutions, finding no significant effect. This is supported by Humphreys (2005). Considering other political impacts, Balch-Lindsay & Enterline (2000) find that neither political grievances nor the age of the political system reaches statistical significance. A common assumption is that the presence of lootable natural resources (like diamonds or drugs) prolongs conflict. The reasoning behind this assumption is that such resources contribute to the financing of insurgencies, and at the same time it can provide rebels with alternative ends; the survival of the campaign rather than military victory may be or become the goal. This has been demonstrated by case studies in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone (Cater 2003: 28-29). Quantitatively, findings are mixed. While Fearon (2004) and Ross (2006) report increased duration as an effect of drugs and gems, Humphreys (2005) finds an opposite effect by looking at diamond production. Collier *et al.* (2004) find no significant effect neither from primary exports as a share of GDP, nor from terrain variables measuring the presence of forest or mountain cover. In sum, the greed-based assumption regarding lootable resources and terrain seems highly tenuous. Regarding demographic variables, Humphreys (2005) finds that ethnic fractionalization prolongs conflict. A non-monotonic relationship is found by Collier *et al.* (2004), indicating that countries with mid-level ethnic fractionalization have longer conflicts than other countries. Fearon (2004) and Cunningham *et al.* (2005) find no significant effect from this variable. Further, Cunningham and associates find that conflicts categorized as 'ethnic' are not significantly longer-lasting than other conflicts (*ibid.*). Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2007) conclude that countries with high levels of ethnic polarization experience significantly longer civil wars. Religious fractionalization did not prove significant in Collier *et al.*'s (2004) analysis.

Examining identity cleavages, Tuscisny (2004), performing a Cox regression, finds no significant relationship between civilizational divides and conflict duration. Other studies evaluate religion more directly. Signifying that ethnoreligious conflicts are longer-lasting, Regan (2002: 68), employing a Weibull model, finds that in these conflicts the probability of conflict termination in a given month is reduced by 36 percent compared to ideological conflicts. This is supported by Fox (2004b), who,

comparing conflicts with and without religious differences in a t-test, finds the former to be significantly longer-lasting. An explanation may be found in negotiation failure. According to Pfetsch & Rohloff: ‘Out of 121 conflicts over ethnic, religious and regional autonomy, only thirteen conflicts or 11 percent were resolved by negotiations’ (2000: 202-203). This is supported by Svensson (2007a: 941), who finds that conflicts with religious incompatibilities are less likely to be ended by negotiations. However, his probit model finds no significant results in this regard when it comes to conflicts with religious dissimilarities, meaning that the parties split on religious adherence.

In total, previous findings indicate that faith indeed impacts on conflict dynamics. Still, the influences on intensity and duration are not confirmed beyond doubt and would benefit from further verification. This thesis attempts to provide this by employing a more fine-grained religious indicator than those cited above, including all relevant world religions and their denominations.⁷ Furthermore, the analysis includes conflicts throughout the post-World War II period (1946-2004).⁸

⁷ Nordås (2007) and Svensson (2007a) have the most fine-grained variables known to this author. Nordås’ variable includes the following values: Christian, Islam, Buddhist, Hindu, Confucian, and Animist, plus the Christian and Islam sub-categories of Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Sunni, and Shi’a (Nordås 2007: 13). Svensson includes Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Shintoism, plus the same sub-categories as Nordås (Svensson 2007b). My own variable the same variables as Nordås plus the following: Jewish, Sikhist, the Buddhist sub-categories Theravada and Other Buddhist, and a nonreligious category. For more information on my operationalization, see section 4.3.3.

⁸ In comparison, Nordås (2007) and Svensson (2007a) limit their analyses to the post-Cold War period (1989-2005 and 1989-2003, respectively). Of the above mentioned analyses including religious differences, Fox (2004c) and Lacina (2006) analyze the temporally most comprehensive datasets, encompassing 1945-2001 and 1946-2002, respectively. Pearce (2005) consider 1946-2001, and Fox (2004b) examines the years 1950-1996. In these other analyses, none have explanation variables as fine-grained as Nordås (2007) or Svensson (2007b).

3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

He [Bhindranwale] evoked the image of a great war between good and evil waged in the present day: "a struggle ... for our faith, for the Sikh nation, for the oppressed." He implored his young followers to rise up and marshal the forces of righteousness. "The Guru will give you strength," he assured them (Juergensmeyer 1993: 95).

Analyses of the relationship between religion and the intensity and duration of conflicts are still relatively few. The following sections present a theoretical framework that is well suited to improve the understanding of the religion-conflict nexus.⁹ The framework differentiates between problems within groups and problems between groups. A typical within-group problem is that of collective action, rendering mobilization difficult. Between groups the problem of credible commitment may reduce prospects for peaceful settlement. These problems have previously been extensively theorized, but they have not been applied to this research question. They are based on rational choice, seeing individuals and groups as welfare-maximizing agents who calculate costs and benefits in order to choose the best possible outcome.¹⁰ Further, I will discuss how religion is connected to the problems. It will be shown that a religious cleavage may help overcome intragroup problems whereas it may aggravate intergroup problems. Several hypotheses are deduced from the discussion.

3.1 Presenting the Problems

3.1.1 Intragroup Problems

Rebels and incumbents both face intragroup problems. However, such problems are usually harder to overcome for rebels. Governments have already established a more or less efficient army prior to rebellion, and they normally have the ability to compensate the soldiers' costs through private, financial rewards. In this way incumbents may acquire both loyalty and trust from their soldiers. And even if loyalty and trust are not established, government soldiers know that they risk punishment in the form of losing their salaries or worse if they do not perform their job properly. Intragroup problems will, therefore, be discussed with regard to the rebel group only.

⁹ This chapter partly builds on Lindberg (2008).

¹⁰ For a detailed introduction to rational choice, see Elster (1986, 1989).

Three intragroup problems will be discussed. The first is that of collective action, or free-riding. To carry out a rebellion, rebel leaders need to mobilize their followers. Mobilization is '[t]he process by which the armed forces or parts of them are brought to a state of readiness for conflict ... This includes assembling and organizing personnel, formations, materiel and supplies for active military services, as well as training' (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2007). In protracted and intense conflicts mobilization is especially important. It might also be especially hard, as victory will become ever harder to imagine and the death tolls rise.

The ultimate goal of a rebellion is to attain a public good. This might be in the form of radical change in government policy, installing a new government, acquiring regional autonomy, or seceding to form a new state. Public goods have two defining properties. First, they are non-rival in consumption; 'once it is provided, the additional resource cost of another person consuming the good is zero' (Rosen 1999: 61). Second, public goods are non-excludable (*ibid.*: 62). This means that, once the public good is attained, associated benefits are available to all members of society with no regard of whether or not they contributed to its coming about.

Free-riding occurs when mobilization fails because individuals decide not to fight even though they support the rebels' cause (Collier 2000: 98-99). After all, fighting a war is costly; it inflicts a time loss and a serious risk of being injured, maimed, or even killed. However, since the goal is a non-excludable public good, it might be desirable to let others carry the burden of bringing about the good. A soldier may be tempted to opt out and let the others fight for his cause. The rationale for staying passive and letting others fight for the public good is the following: (1) the outcome only to an imperceptible degree depends on the individual's participation; (2) participation inflicts costs through lost time and the risk of injury or death; and (3) the benefits from winning will be available whether one participates or not (Lindberg 2008: 8).

This is the rebel's dilemma (Lichbach 1995). Consider the situation for a rational, welfare-maximizing rebel, *P*, in a situation of ongoing civil war. *P* has the following options: (*a*) to stay with his group and continue to fight or (*b*) to put down his weapon and leave the group. *P* seeks to maximize his individual utility. Hence, his

decision will be based on a consideration of different outcomes and their associated costs and benefits. According to the above reasoning, benefits will be the same whether he fights or not. The probability of rebel success does not change significantly if P opts out, and the public good, if attained, is non-excludable. Costs, however, change substantially. Choosing alternative a implies a continued risk of injury and death, in addition to time spent. Alternative b implies a much smaller risk of injury and death, while time can be spent on productive activities. Unless he faces reprisals from his fellow fighters, the only rational choice is alternative b . This will reduce his costs considerably while benefits remain practically unchanged.¹¹ The same reasoning applies to every member of the rebel group. Hence, everyone will lay down their weapons and nobody will work for the public good. As a consequence the desired change does not come about.

Two other problems complicate the mobilization process further. The coordination problem occurs as people are reluctant to join small rebel groups. A small group has a lower probability to prevail than a large group. Besides, in small groups, costs and risks of punishment are shared among fewer people (Collier 2000: 99). Consequently, recruitment is more difficult for small groups than for large ones. Even though there are many who are willing to join a large group, there is no large group to join, as there are only a few who are willing to join a small group (*ibid.*). This further inhibits mobilization and the realization of the public good.

Finally, the time-consistency problem is a problem of intragroup trust. It occurs when potential fighters perceive that ‘the rebel leader has a much stronger incentive to promise things than he has subsequently to deliver them’ (*ibid.*: 99). In order to reach the goal of autonomy, secession, regime change or policy change, rebels need to fight first. But how do they know conditions will improve if they come off victorious? How will rebel leaders act if the campaign is successful? Will future actions be consistent with their present promises? Leaders need to prove to their followers that they have the capacity and desire to follow up on their promises. If this is uncertain, mobilization will be a hard task and the attainment of the public good will be hindered.

¹¹ In fact, P may reach the same conclusion even if he does risk reprisals (as long as he does not face certain death). This cost will simply be weighed against other costs.

What are the implications for conflict intensity and duration? Intragroup problems render effective mobilization difficult. Rebel groups experiencing such problems stay small, and, hence, fewer soldiers are on the battlefield. As a consequence, there are fewer people to kill and to be killed in battle. Intensity should, therefore, be lower where parties experience collective action problems.

What about duration? Assuming that intragroup problems primarily concern rebels, the implications for duration is ambiguous. Where rebels manage to overcome intragroup problems they will be capable of surviving a long time. This is because they have the ability to recruit new fighters and attract further support (financial and other). However, if they are sufficiently successful in overcoming the problems, they may be able to defeat the government army quickly. Where rebels struggle with intragroup problems they will not manage to stage more than a minor insurgency. Whether or not this is quickly crushed depend on factors like government willingness to pursue the rebels and the rebels' opportunities for hiding. All in all, implications for duration are uncertain. For a better understanding of duration, we now turn to intergroup problems.

3.1.2 Intergroup Problems

Intragroup problems concern the parties' ability to mobilize and fight effectively. Intergroup problems, on the other hand, relate to the prospects for stable peace settlements. James D. Fearon (2004) has pointed out that the fighting parties could both be better off in a situation of peace. In general, both sides suffer losses during a civil war. Theoretically, even if one party finds a conflict profitable in itself, there are always peace agreements that will give them at least the same level of utility while the other party becomes better off. Consider a case where the rebels' (R) utility from civil war compared to peace is $U_R^{CW} = k_R > 0$, while the government's (G) utility is $U_G^{CW} = k_G < 0$. k_i is the net benefits of war for group i and $k_i = p_i - c_i$, where p_i represents war-related profits and c_i expresses costs of war for group i . As long as $k_R - k_G < 0$ mutually beneficial peace agreements exist through trade-offs.¹² When the credible

¹² In other words, this allows for positive net benefits of war for one group, but presupposes that these are counterbalanced by the other groups' net losses. I do not consider situations where $U_R^{CW} - U_G^{CW} > 0$ as this is highly improbable. The most common situation is where $U_R^{CW} < 0$ and $U_G^{CW} < 0$, making trade-offs unnecessary for the argument to be valid.

commitment problem occurs, rational actors dismiss these agreements and choose prolonged war.

Developing a game-theoretic model, Fearon shows how secessionist wars are difficult to end due to the problem of credible commitment (*ibid.*: 291-297).¹³ In his model, violent conflicts occur when the government is weak. The rebels see a window of opportunity and exploit it. Even with the permanent existence of mutually favourable peace agreements in the model, there are conditions that prohibit a peaceful solution. This holds even though parties are rational utility-maximizers. How can this be?

From a situation of internal conflict, there are three possible outcomes that potentially can establish and maintain peace. The first consists in the government suppressing the rebellion, neutralizing the threat, and re-establishing the monopoly of violence. This implies that incumbents are able to defeat the rebels and remove the threat of future uprisings. Second, the rebel group can prevail. In a secessionist war, that entails the formation of a new state. This solution brings about two separate monopolies of violence: the incumbents in the old state re-establish theirs, while leaders of the new state set up their own. In a coup d'état or revolution the incumbents are toppled and the rebels install a new government and re-establish the state's monopoly of violence. Third, the belligerents can settle the conflict peacefully. This solution involves putting down their weapons, signing a peace treaty, and the establishment of mutual trust. Given that neither party is able to defeat the other, mutual trust is a precondition for lasting peace. Without intergroup trust, the parties will not be willing to put down their weapons. The credible commitment problem relates to the last solution. The problem arises when (1) mutually beneficial deals can be arranged, (2) these deals are identified by the parties, and (3) at least one party is unwilling to sign a settlement.

The problem is used to demonstrate the lack of rebel trust in the government, but it is relevant for the government as well, even though Fearon does not develop that part of the argument. On the rebels' side, the reason they will not settle is an

¹³ Even though Fearon focuses on secessionist wars, the problem can be applied to other types of conflict, such as conflict over government control or resources. For a more detailed presentation of the model, see Fearon (2004).

expectation of the government to renege on their promises as soon as it regains its strength (*ibid.*: 277). In other words, they do not trust the government to be able to commit credibly to peace. Entering into a peace agreement removes the condition of anarchy that exists during civil war, leaving the monopoly of violence in the hands of the government. For the rebels, then, it is better to keep fighting, especially if agreeing to peace demands the handing in of weaponry, leaving the rebel group extremely vulnerable (Walter 1997: 337). On the government's side, the problem consists in an expectation of hidden rebel rearmament and following raids and insurgencies. Thus, incumbents may have incentives to defeat their foes as soon as possible, while their identity and whereabouts are known, thus neutralizing the threat instead of risking future surprise attacks.

Fearon's model of the commitment problem involves two active players: the central government (G) and the rebel group (R). At the outset of a period nature (N) decides whether or not one party is strong enough to win. The probability of rebel victory is $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, and the probability of government victory is $\beta \in [0, 1]$. The third possibility is a stalemate, which has a probability of $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ ($\alpha + \beta + \gamma = 1$). If one group prevails, the war is over.¹⁴ If no one defeats the other, the parties choose in turn whether or not to fight. Choosing to stop fighting will grant the other party the victory. If both parties choose to continue fighting, another war period follows, beginning with N 's decision (Fearon 2004: 291-293).

Outcome is written on the form (U_G, U_R) , where U_G and U_R represent the utility for the government and the rebels, respectively. Rebel victory gives $(0, \delta/(1-\delta))$, where δ is the common discount factor applied to all future payoffs. This solution leaves nothing for the government. Government victory yields (k_G, k_R) , where k might be a positive or negative value. This involves a return to status quo, and the only effect of the war period is the (positive or negative) net benefits of both sides. The third possible outcome in the model is the fight equilibrium. This yields the same

¹⁴ If the rebels win, the game is over. If the government wins, the game goes to a peace period, which might lead to a new outbreak of civil war. For more on peace periods and other aspects of the model, see Fearon (2004: 291-297).

immediate outcome as government victory (k_G, k_R) (*ibid.*: 292). However, this will lead to a new war period and new outcomes.¹⁵

Given that the game is not ended by nature, what is needed for the game to remain in the fight equilibrium? A necessary condition is that the costs of fighting are below a sustainable level. Strictly materially speaking, both parties must obtain enough resources to finance the war-related costs. They need to procure food, arms, and other equipment for the fighters. Additionally, and the core of the problem, a precondition is that the parties cannot establish hope for peace and trust in one another. Without this precondition being satisfied, conflict will be prolonged as the groups fear their belligerents will take up the fight when it possesses the needed capacity. In fact, where mutual trust is not present, a war will keep running even though it is of great cost due to the inclusion of future costs and profits in the utility function. Indeed, for the rebel side keeping the *status quo* may be seen as a higher cost than continued fighting, especially if there is an expectation of a stronger government (meaning fighting today is less costly than in the future), future reprisals, discrimination, or political exclusion.

The credible commitment problem has been found to be ‘the single most successful explanation for why civil war negotiations failed’ (Walter 1997: 349). Hence, the problem is not the lack of negotiations or good will, neither is it the presence of information problems. The problem is that

once [the warring parties] lay down their weapons and begin to integrate their separate assets into a new united state, it becomes almost impossible to either enforce future cooperation or survive attack. In the end, negotiations fail because civil war adversaries cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms (Walter 1997: 336).

Considering the findings of Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal (2006) this should come as no surprise. Successful settlements require the presence of positive emotions like hope. Without hope for a peaceful future, the parties will not even consider entering into negotiations. However, fear tends to dominate over hope in situations of conflict. Based on an interdisciplinary approach, Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal contend that fear is a primary emotion, whereas hope is a secondary emotion. Primary emotions are those

¹⁵ Although Fearon does not specify it, future war periods will include discounted values of future possible outcomes.

who are ‘spontaneous, fast, uncontrolled, and unintentional’ (*ibid.*: 369). They are automatic responses to impressions. Secondary emotions like hope, in contrast, are more complex, involving cognitive processes and, hence, are often inhibited by primary emotions (*ibid.*: 367). In situations of conflict fear has a protective function, enhancing individuals’ chances of survival (*ibid.*: 371). Fear works directly and ‘once activated, it has a strong effect on thinking. In general, its dominance often reduces the probability that hope will be activated’ (*ibid.*: 374).

Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal continue to discuss how these emotions work in collectives in general, and in societies involved in intractable conflict in particular. They contend that collective fear orientations are inevitable in intractable conflict. In conflict situations the focus is on the ‘evil and mal-intentional acts of the adversary, which are threatening and full of dangers’ (*ibid.*: 378). Resulting emotions are not easily forgotten. Rather, they are embedded in the group’s collective memory. In turn, group solidarity and cohesiveness increase (*ibid.*: 379), deepening the intergroup divergence, reducing prospects for reconciliation and peace, and strengthening the problem of credible commitment.

3.2 Introducing Religion

The presented problems do not presuppose religious cleavages. They may be important in all kinds of conflict. However, in religious conflicts they may work differently. In the following, I will put forth a series of arguments related to why and how religious cleavages affect intra- and intergroup problems. It will be argued that a religious cleavage can ease intragroup problems and reinforce intergroup problems. The following discussion takes into consideration religious conflict-issues as well as cleavages based on religious affiliations. This is because conflicts where parties are divided on religious adherence often become framed as religious conflicts, transforming them into value conflicts, even though they are originally fought over other issues. Narratives of religious conflict can accordingly become self-fulfilling prophecies. First, however, I will establish the relevance of religious identity to armed conflict.

3.2.1 The Importance of Religious Identity in Conflict

Before discussing religious identity in particular, the general concept of collective identity will be briefly addressed. Are collective identities of importance? Do people at all identify with their communities? Religion is merely one of many sources of collective identity. Intrastate wars offer examples of movements based on collective identities like ideology (for example the Cambodian Khmer Rouge), nationalism (for example the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)), and religion (for example al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Egypt). According to Frances Stewart group membership is an 'intrinsic part of human life' (Stewart 2002: 2) and the welfare of one's group is important for the welfare of the individual member (*ibid.*: 5). This corresponds well with the applied definition of religion and Hardin's notion of identification. Taking a constructivist approach, David Snow asserts that collective identities have an orientational quality to which protagonists and adversaries respond, implying a notion of both identity and identification. Furthermore, the notion of 'we-ness' generates a sense of collective agency, both accommodating and inviting collective action (Snow 2001: 4-5).

Moving on to the more confined notion of religious identification, does religious identification differ from other sorts of identification? If so, how and why? Individuals have several sources of identification. They may feel a sense of belonging to their family, gender, region, political ideology, class, ethnic group, and, if any, religion. Different identifications may in some cases be contradictory. Does that imply that a single source of identification cannot significantly influence individual or group behaviour? I will claim that it can. Stewart states that group identities 'are a fundamental influence on behaviour' (2002: 2). Different identifications may all be important, but religion holds a unique position. Faith is a matter of conviction and truth. Religion involves two factors influencing behaviour. First, a religion 'consists of a discursive, often essentialist, view of its realm as an organic whole' (Kinnvall 2004: 758). This is the belief-system. Second, people try to live by religious doctrine, rules, and customs, for instance the Ten Commandments. This includes 'some superior claim to a particular notion of truth and mode of earthly existence' (*ibid.*: 758-759). Coupled with the importance of morality, people will try to live up the ideals of what is good,

right, and true. The most salient acts are visits to places of worship, praying, and wearing religious symbols like the Christian Cross. Other acts may, for instance, be serving as good Samaritans. Furthermore, the identification of a religious group and its concept of truth will consequently lead to identifying other groups and judging these other groups on the basis of the 'truth' they know. This distinguishes 'out-groups' from one's own 'in-group'.

If religious identification and collective identities are important, how does this affect civil war? How can religion and religious identities be connected to conflict? Religion is often considered to be a promoter of peace. In fact, all major religions have expressed obligations to the value of peace (Gopin 1997: 1). Still, as exemplified by the quotes at the beginning of each chapter, holy scriptures tend to include passages related to violence and religious authorities provide statements that legitimate acts of war. Scholars have repeatedly found religion to be a factor contributing to conflict. R. Scott Appleby has pointed out 'the ambivalence of the sacred' (Appleby 2000), an embedded religious duality; religion works both to facilitate peace and to justify violent means. The latter function is evident in wars all over the world. Religion is being utilized as an identity marker. Faith has repeatedly been used by elites to mobilize believers and spark hostility. Religious provision of legitimacy to acts of violence is manifested through speeches, symbols, financing, and direct acts of religious leaders. Faith may thus become a catalyst of violence. Although religious leaders may function as advocates for peace, this role is more likely to be at work in non-religious conflicts. When adversaries adhere to different religions it opens for religious leaders and political entrepreneurs to exploit the situation and fuel the conflict by framing the conflict as a matter of right and wrong, of good and evil, perhaps even as a matter of survival. Adversaries thus easily become an out-group, the 'evil' other, not deserving the same treatment as the 'good' members of the in-group.

So far the purpose has merely been to establish a link between religion and conflict. Let us now turn to how faith affects intra- and intergroup problems.

3.2.2 Religion and Intragroup Problems

Intragroup problems can be solved in various ways. Collier (2000) differentiates between solutions based on social capital and greed. He considers the latter to be the most effective. Through economic compensation the free-rider problem may be solved, as there are benefits for participants that are not available to non-participants. Money and valuables are rival and excludable goods able to sidestep the free-rider problem. Similarly, coordination and time-consistency problems are solved. The former because the rebels can get hold of small areas of resource-rich land with only a small group and because side payments make small groups more attractive for prospective soldiers. The latter because soldiers do not need to rely upon promises; they get paid during the campaign. Nonetheless, this solution to the problems is neither more nor less relevant to faith-based groups than to others. Social capital, on the other hand, involves culture and norms, and is a way around intragroup problems even for those without access to private financial rewards. Culture and norms are highly relevant for religion. In fact, Collier believes that the effect of social capital may be confined to religious and ethnic groups (*ibid.*: 100). But how exactly does social capital affect intragroup problems? I will first consider the collective action problem.

Salient and clearly defined groups ease mobilization. As Ted Gurr has claimed, ‘the greater the salience of ethnocultural identity for people with shared descent, cultural traits, and historical experience, the more likely they are to define their interests in ethnocultural terms and the easier it is for leaders to mobilize them for collective action’ (Gurr 2000: 66). As defined religion is a basis for identity. This is, as shown above, important both in times of peace and in times of war. Through social capital groups become communities, not only a collection of individuals. In Hardin’s terms the members identify with the collective, the in-group. Besides, such identification with one’s group implies providing others with different identities, thus forming out-groups. Southern Sudan demonstrates this function. There Christian values strengthened southern solidarity and at the same time invigorated people to resist northern pressure (Assefa 1990: 256). It has also been noted that perceptions of in- and out-groups tend to become more salient in situations of conflict (Kunovich & Hodson 1999: 646-647).

Religion provides readily made groups. Although the group should not be treated as unitary (Kalyvas 2003: 481), common belief- and value-systems contribute to less internal division. Scott Gates speaks of distance as a factor influencing cohesiveness. Distance is thought of not only in geographical terms, but also relating to ethnicity and ideology (Gates 2002: 113). It is also relevant for religion. In this context distance is short where people have similar beliefs and it is long where people adhere to different religions. Gates shows that private greed-based benefits are unnecessary, or at least less essential, where distance is short. Cohesion should be strong anyway. Empirically this means that rebels will more easily stay with their group and perform their duties if their faith is shared by other rebels.

Moreover, when religious groups fight each other, combatants can be recruited to fight for what they believe is right, for the 'truth'. This is related to one of the elements of religion as defined, namely the behaviour-influencing belief-system. It is easier to mobilize people to fight against those who are perceived as opposed to one's God, value-systems, and one's worldview. Because God's success demands the obedience of believers, religious conflicts can become larger than life and turn into cosmic wars (Juergensmeyer 2003: 149; Pearce 2005: 337). Church involvement in the former Yugoslavia might have contributed vastly to such an understanding. There, 'church officials on all sides defended the war effort. Clergy members bound together church and state and effectively turned the war into a fight for God' (Kunovich & Hodson 1999: 650). Moreover, the Orthodox Church in fact criticized Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic 'for not going far enough to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia' (*ibid.*). This accentuates how religion as a source of legitimacy influences the legitimacy of violent means.

The mentioned factors influence individual assessment of costs and benefits, thus influencing the collective action problem. When religion is involved, benefits from victory become greater. Victory might involve the end of religious discrimination, the disestablishment of the 'wrong' state religion, or the establishment of the 'right' state religion. However, these are all public goods. More relevant are the benefits of being a holy warrior. This provides social benefits through enhanced status and respect and emotional benefits resulting from actions in favour of the collective,

God and the truth. The status of holy warrior makes a fighter into a hero if the rebels prevail, and if he dies in the process he is a martyr (Juergensmeyer 2003: 170). This is a paradox; death, usually regarded as the ultimate cost, is turned into the ultimate benefit.

In this context, it is important to note how individuals have different time horizons. Jeremy Weinstein differentiates between two types of insurgents: consumers and investors. The former are prepared to participate only if it grants short-time gains, whereas the latter have longer time horizons and are willing to make costly investments in the future (Weinstein 2007: 9). This is the difference between soldiers mobilized by private, financial means and those mobilized through faith. The status of holy warrior may provide private benefits in afterlife of a value that cannot be matched in this world (Sosis & Alcorta 2008). For instance, Muslim martyrs are promised a place in heaven where they are awaited by 72 virgins (Ferrero 2006: 856). These heavenly rewards are excludable and, hence, provide private incentives. With time horizons encompassing the afterlife, what is normally thought of as long-term benefits, like secession or regime change, should rather be considered medium-term benefits. And as life before death is regularly considered less important than the afterlife, discount rates will arguably be low.

Considering costs, leaving the fighting to others may be seen as a violation of norms and as an act against the welfare of the group. Socially this would not be of high importance if a defector did not have to see his former companions again, but the existence of a religious community reduces this possibility. A deserter might have to live among those he abandoned. He might meet them in church and other public places, and he might even be branded infidel. Defecting may be seen as an act of evil, a break with doctrine, and a misdeed against God. This is a private cost that people of faith are likely to avoid. Again, this is related to the high appreciation for the future, including the afterlife, and the low discount rates of religious believers. These social costs are arguably higher when religious distance is short. Disregarding social costs, defection may nonetheless seem emotionally costly if the defector himself considers his act a violation of God's will.

Another argument concerning costs is that joining or staying with the group, as compared to staying passive or defecting, is less costly when the group is formed around a salient identity. Considering groups formed around religion, it is likely that all adherents will be designated as targets, not only those who carry weapons, because adversaries see them in terms of a shared identity, and killing civilians belonging to this group might be considered a potent weapon of deterrence as well as a good in its own right, especially if they are considered evil and unworthy.

Rebel leaders will identify these individual cost-benefit considerations and use them in the mobilization process. It is important to note that this potential is not confined to religious leaders. Political entrepreneurs, seeking own private gain, can just as well exploit existing identifications to their advantage. Even if entrepreneurs do not share the dissidents' beliefs and values, they can utilize these beliefs and values for mobilization. This may be done, for instance, by depicting adversaries as a fundamental threat to the beliefs of the followers or by adopting instrumental narratives and symbols of victimization, thus enhancing the visibility of 'us' and 'them'. Such narratives and symbols do not even need to belong to the group itself. They may refer to another group in a similar position and still have the desirable effect (Lichbach 1995: 90). Additionally, they may wear religious symbols, presenting themselves as people of faith. Examples of this can be found in the wars of the Balkans in the 1990s, where '[t]he leader of the notorious Serb Tigers, Arkan, was often photographed wearing an enormous Orthodox crucifix' (Bruce 2005: 19). Similarly, a Serb press agency spread a photograph of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic 'kissing the communion cup held by the Orthodox Bishop' (*ibid.*). Elites are in this manner portrayed as agents of good. Such use of symbols promotes common values and the feeling of unity and solidarity. Hence, it contributes to the overcoming of 'pecuniary self-interest' (Lichbach 1995: 94).

These functions focus on the in-group. However, a focus on the out-group may be even more expedient. Adversaries may be demonized, identified as evil. This factor holds unique content in religious conflicts. After all, there can only be one holy scripture and one holy people, and the others' identity, their doctrine, and their god(s) break with this. This implies breaking with the 'truth'. As Hindus and Muslims in

India, all religious communities regard their faith as the true one; ‘it is the Religion, *dharma* or *din*; the other is just an erroneous opinion, *mat*’ (Gaborieau 1985: 9, emphasis in original). A prominent example of demonization can be found in Northern Ireland, where ‘Protestants see themselves as the victims of a holy crusade by the Catholic church to destroy one of the last strongholds of Protestantism in Europe’ (Bruce 2005: 10). In a similar manner, Serbian Christians introduced stories of the Christ-killer tradition in their fight against the Bosnian Muslims, something that contributed to perpetuate the violence. This worked even though the Bosnian Muslims did not exist at the time of Christ. Furthermore, Bosnian Muslims were held responsible for the death of the Serb nation, which nevertheless continues to exist (Pearce 2005: 337). Going even further, adversaries may be dehumanized. The most famous example is the Holocaust, where the Nazis labelled ‘Jews as vermin, bacilli, and “kikes”’ (Mandel 2002: 105). Such labels are intended to portray enemies as subhuman and counteract empathy. They place out-groups ‘outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply’ (Opatow cited in Maoz & McCauley 2008: 95). A recent study on Israel finds dehumanization to significantly explain support for ‘retaliatory aggressive policies’ aimed at Palestinians (Maoz & McCauley 2008). Moreover, Albert Bandura and colleagues have performed a series of electroshock experiments demonstrating how the aggressiveness of perpetrators increases with dehumanization (Fletcher & Weinstein 2002: 609). A related mechanism arises when antagonists are portrayed as a great threat. Such ideas are found in a multitude of conflicts. Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) has demonstrated the presence of defensive thought among Israeli Jews, Palestinian Muslims, Indian Sikhs, and Northern Irish Protestants. Perceived threats have been shown to work similarly to dehumanization, creating support for aggressive retaliation (Maoz & McCauley 2008). Out-group mechanisms may influence cost-benefit considerations. Assuming long time horizons and low discount rates, it will be a great cost to let the Catholic Church destroy a Protestant stronghold or to stay passive while Christ-killers slay your brethren. Passivity might be punished in the afterlife, for instance through the loss of salvation. It is better then to become a holy fighter, something that is accompanied by great rewards.

The second problem, that of coordination, might also be overcome easier when religion is a factor. The problem arises because prospective soldiers are unaware of the preferences of other prospective soldiers. If they all knew one another's preferences, the problem would be avoided. Shared faith provides two useful mechanisms in this regard. First, individuals who share religions are more likely to know each other than individuals who do not, *ceteris paribus*. They may meet in church or on religious celebrations. If they know each other, they might know, or easily access, each other's preferences. Second, they may share contacts. If a religious leader is involved in mobilization, communication is enhanced and transaction costs are reduced. Communication profits because religious leaders regularly speak to their community *en masse*. As defined, religion is associated with the presence of institutions. These can be exploited by religious leaders or political entrepreneurs in the mobilization process. Places of worship can thus become arenas for mobilization, providing 'the logistical basis for mass mobilization' (Fox & Sandler 2005: 295). Public speech reduces transaction costs as it allows for the same message to be transmitted to multiple receivers simultaneously. Furthermore, transaction costs are reduced because a religious leader can talk to the members of the community individually, and share the different preferences in the group. Without a shared contact, the community members would have to talk to each other, every man to every other, in order to coordinate. Jon Elster has demonstrated the importance of a central coordinator:

If one individual knows and is trusted by one hundred people, he can create the information conditions by two hundred transactions – first asking each of them about their willingness to join [collective action] and then telling each about the willingness of everyone else. By contrast bilateral communication between the hundred will require about five thousand acts of communication (Elster cited in Lichbach 1995: 170).

The church in Nicaragua exemplifies this function. They provided the guerrillas with recruits and supplies. 'Clerics working in poor barrios, in the countryside, or with university and high school student protesters became contact points between the FSLN [Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional] and the Christian neighborhood organizations throughout Nicaragua' (Booth cited in Lichbach 1995: 401 n. 47).

The time-consistency problem as well is affected by religion. As mentioned above the problem is a matter of intragroup trust, more specifically the trust the masses have in their leaders. At a general level, believers should be more inclined to champion a cause when prominent leaders of their religious community provide support. People are not willing to fight, even for a just cause, if they expect the leaders to betray the cause. For leaders to be trusted, they need some sort of legitimacy or authenticity. Hence, the concept of social capital is of central importance. Of course, religious leaders may have greater incentives to promise than to carry out their promises, just like any other leader. Still, if the fight is over religious issues, it is likely that a religious leader will follow up on these as it is in his own interest. But to the core of the problem, even if religious issues are not important in the conflict, religious leaders are more trusted than a regular warlord, especially among followers of the leader's faith. This can be attributed to the short distance, in Gates' terms, between believers and religious leaders.

A recent experiment confirms a correlation between religiosity and trust. It finds that people are trusted more if they are more religious, and with more religious 'trustees' this relationship is more pronounced (Tan & Vogel in press). Besides, according to Kinnvall religion is, together with nationalism, 'more likely than other identity constructions to provide answers to those in need' (Kinnvall 2004: 742). Due to the functions of belief-systems and theology, faith will arguably be more important than nationalism in this regard. Faith provides perceptions of what is true and what is right. Prospective soldiers will, therefore, easier put their trust in someone who shares their beliefs and fight for the true and right cause. This is especially valid when they are supplied with visions of the 'threatened pure' and the 'threatening other'. The distinction between the 'pure' and the 'impure' can be illustrated by Hindu-Muslim tensions in India:

They (the Hindus) totally differ from us in religion, as we believe in nothing which they believe and *vice versa* (...). Their fanaticism is directed against those who do not belong to them – against all foreigners. They call them *mleccha*, i.e. impure, and forbid having any connection with them, be it by marriage or any other kind of relationship, or by sitting, eating, drinking with them, because thereby, they think they would be polluted. The Hindus claim to differ from us, and to be something better than

we, as we on our side, of course, do *vice versa* (Alberuni cited in Gaborieau (1985: 7), emphasis in original).

Such distinctions stress the existence of in- and out-groups. Unquestionably, the ‘pure’ members of the in-group are more easily trusted than the ‘polluted’ members of the out-group. A related topic is the notion of religion as a source of legitimacy, as religious leaders are somehow linked to divine powers. This puts them in a special position to employ religious narratives and mobilize believers. It has been proven that ‘as recently in Serbia, the clergy has often been the key mobilising factor’ (Armstrong 1997: 604). The Balkans have also seen priests among the perpetrators of the Ustaše, and it has been claimed that the pope himself gave the Ustaše support by granting an audience to their leader, Ante Pavelic (Bruce 2005: 18). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the word of religious leaders will more easily be accepted by prospective soldiers than the word of an average warlord.

Durkheim ascribes intragroup trust in a religious community to the ‘effervescent’ role of rituals (Sosis 2005: 9). Rituals are common in civilian life and may be equally salient in military life. For instance, the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army prays regularly (Human Rights Watch 1997: 31). Rituals ‘enable the expression and reaffirmation of shared beliefs, norms, and values and are thus essential for maintaining communal stability and group harmony’ (Sosis 2005: 8). A similar function is held by symbols and songs.

Finally, it should also be noted that the impact of religion does not presuppose active involvement from religious leaders. Unless religious leaders side against them, warlords and political entrepreneurs, religious or not, may profit from the legitimacy provided by religion. Based on this discussion, the first hypothesis can be presented:

H1: Religious conflicts are more intense than non-religious conflicts, *ceteris paribus*.

3.2.3 Religion and Intergroup Problems

The commitment problem arises whenever a group chooses not to sign a peace agreement even though it recognizes it as beneficial, because of an expectation that its

adversary will renege on its promises as soon as it regains its strength. Thus, it is a matter of intergroup trust and of fear dominating over hope. Why should this problem be harder to overcome when the fighting parties split along religious lines?

Identity-based conflicts are in general harder to overcome than other conflicts. Conflicts over economic issues can be solved by financial redistribution, conflicts over political issues can be solved by redistribution of power, but in identity conflicts redistribution and side payments do not suffice. Why is this so? How are religious conflicts different in this regard?

When groups adhere to different religions, they come to see one another as profoundly ‘wrong’. The others may even be evil, demons, or ‘kikes’. Besides, religious divides remain discernible after violence is ended. This kind of social categorization strengthens existing collective fear orientations and leads to a more profound division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, making stable compromises more difficult to reach. This is exemplified by the Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka who opposed and contributed to the breakdown of peace agreements (see chapter 1). Militant monks have argued that the bringing down of the predominantly Hindu LTTE rebels is a prerequisite for establishing dialogue between the parties (Frydenlund 2005: 17). This illustrates three things. First, it confirms that religion becomes relevant to conflicts that are originally fought over other issues. In Sri Lanka, the conflict is originally a secessionist war (Horowitz & Jayamaha 2007). Second, it shows that people in conflict situations identify with their community and at the same time ascribe their adversaries an identity. Third, it exemplifies a collective fear orientation, as monks propose to postpone dialogue until the adversarial group is effectively ‘brought down’. The hope of peaceful coexistence is subdued by the fear of future atrocities. This is exactly what the commitment problem is about.

The mechanisms that are used to overcome intragroup problems will strengthen the problem of credible commitment. In order to mobilize followers it is important to emphasize and promote group identification. Such identification will at the same time accentuate the identity of the adversary. The latter thus becomes an out-group, ‘the other’. They are portrayed as ungodly infidels, unenlightened heretics, or uncivilized heathens. They may even be labelled vermin or evil and tainted. Such dehumanization

and demonization, and the fact that religious identities remain distinguishable post conflict, renders peaceful coexistence difficult. The ‘other’ becomes especially hard to trust. A group that has been the victim of dehumanization will find it difficult to trust the dehumanizing group, because it is hard to know how long the latter is willing to live peacefully side by side with ‘vermin’. Will they try to create a pure society free of evil elements? Similarly, for dehumanizers, acts of pre-emption or revenge cannot be disregarded. It is unquestionably hard to trust Christ-killers and ‘kikes’.

In relation to the commitment problem, dehumanization affects the war-related costs and benefits. Extermination of ‘vermin’ and annihilation of ‘evil’ may be seen as profitable, thus making the killing in itself desirable, a benefit of war. Making concessions to and compromising with the ‘other’ may be considered an act of evil, as betrayal of one’s own group and god(s), thus a great moral and social cost. Moreover, it may involve risk of physical costs, such as injury or death, when followers feel betrayed. This is especially the case where moderation and compromise have been disparaged throughout the war. Hence, violence may be seen as a good option considering the alternatives. Again Sri Lanka is well-suited to illustrate the problem. Although not going as far as demonizing or dehumanizing their foes, militant monks have contributed vastly to the perception of the Sinhalese Buddhists as the ‘pure’ and Tamils as a threat to their purity. The Sinhalese have been depicted to be ‘chosen as a special race to defend and propagate the teachings of the Buddha’ (Gregg 2004: 144). Moreover, militant monks have founded the *Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya* (MSV), an organization that has argued in favour of force ‘to repel the Tamil threat and defend the Buddhist state’ (*ibid.*: 140), exemplifying a zero-sum view and portraying of belligerents as the threatening ‘other’.

Even if means like demonization and dehumanization have not been implemented, lack of intergroup trust may still be a vigorous problem. This is because groups belonging to separate faiths also belong to different congregations. Religious institutions are still potent arenas for mobilization, and activities inside a church, synagogue, or temple are inaccessible to non- or ‘wrong’-believers. When the groups have different belief-systems and worldviews, obey different god(s), and live by

different doctrines as well, trust may be hard to establish. And again, a history of past killing across religious divides does not make intergroup trust easier.

Other aspects of religion contribute to the problem of credible commitment. One of the properties of religion is its indivisibility. Religious issues can hardly be compromised upon. A state can only be governed after the rules of one religion. It can only have one state religion and the head of state can only adhere to one faith. Thus, religious policy is easily monopolized. This distinguishes religious conflicts from those based on ethnicity or nationality. Ethnic groups can compromise without reducing the utility of any group.¹⁶ If one group gets to implement its religious policy, raising the group's utility, this will be at the expense of other religions, reducing the utility of other religious groups. This raises the cost of giving up the fight, as the winners will occupy the leading positions and can dictate religious policy. It also raises the costs of settlement, as this cannot be achieved without making concessions. Religious conflict may be a matter of dignity or of all or nothing. Consequently, the possibility of stable fight equilibrium is higher than in other conflicts. This all or nothing orientation is further strengthened when belligerents perceive the contested territory, state, or issue to have no substitute of equivalent value (Svensson 2007a: 931). Conflicts over religion can thus be seen as a zero-sum game, and losers might be expected to resume the fight as soon as it has the opportunity. As such, a commitment to sacred values may become an obstacle to a commitment to peace.

As for intragroup problems, social capital is highly relevant in order to overcome intergroup problems. If leaders have enough social capital, enmity and hostility may be bridged. They may generate hope of peaceful coexistence, and subjugate fear of future violence. However, as Collier points out, '[s]ocial capital usually does not span ethnic and religious divides' (Collier 2000: 100). Or in Gates' terminology, the distance between elites is great. Of course, a history of killing across religious divides does not make things any easier. Although a government that has inflicted severe enough grievances to start a civil war may be hard to trust anyhow, establishing mutual trust is an even more difficult task where the rebels make up a

¹⁶ For instance through power sharing agreements or economic redistribution.

cohesive religious group and see the incumbents as wrong-believers in addition to wrong-doers. From this discussion the second hypothesis is derived:

H2: Religious conflicts last longer than non-religious conflicts, *ceteris paribus*.

3.2.4 Religious discrimination

Other religious factors may also influence conflict dynamics. Religious discrimination is present, to some degree, in most countries of the world (Fox 2007a: 66-67) and during the 1990s the average levels increased for all major religions and in all regions except Latin America (*ibid.*: 52). Theoretically, discrimination could impact on conflict intensity and duration. Discrimination distinguishes between those in power and those who are not. It is a means of protecting the culture and identity of the dominant group or of suppressing a threatening or polluting minority culture (*ibid.*: 60). Consequently, it is also a threat to the belief-system and world-view of the discriminated. Discrimination may be important in all kinds of conflict. However, religious discrimination is expected to primarily affect those with a religious cleavage.

The relevant function of discrimination in conflict situations is through grievance formation (Gurr 1993). Fox (1999b) has found religious discrimination to be the best predictor of religious grievances, the effect being strongly positive and highly significant. Those who are discriminated against will typically evolve feelings of discontent and unfairness. These grievances can then be utilized in the mobilization process (Fox 2000b). Grievances can become instruments for entrepreneurs seeking to recruit new fighters, and they can be used to accentuate collective identity, hence improving group cohesion. They thus contribute to the formation of in- and out-groups. At the same time, this may cause adversarial and hateful feelings towards the discriminators. Theoretically, this should reduce defection, thus giving more people to kill and be killed. From this a third hypothesis is derived:

H3: In conflicts with a religious cleavage, higher religious discrimination leads to more intense conflicts, *ceteris paribus*.

With the introduction of discrimination social capital is less likely to span religious divides. As well as emphasizing identities and promoting antagonistic feelings, a history of religious discrimination should reduce intergroup trust. Moreover, it may be even more costly for rebel elites to settle with discriminatory opponents. From the rebels' point of view, discrimination is proof that the government either fears them or considers them subordinate in some way. On the other hand, the discrimination may be an effect of the government's lack of trust in the discriminated. Either way, it is expected that:

H4: In conflicts with a religious cleavage, higher religious discrimination leads to longer conflicts, *ceteris paribus*.

3.2.5 Religious legitimacy

Religious legitimacy is defined as 'the extent to which it is legitimate to invoke religion in political discourse' (Fox 1999b: 297). According to secularization theory religion should no longer be important in politics, and religious rhetoric should be ineffectual. As shown above, however, secularization theory has failed in its predictions. Still, religion is not equally legitimate in political processes everywhere. Where religious legitimacy is low the effect of religion can be expected to diminish in comparison with cases where religion is in fact legitimate.

Religious legitimacy has been shown to influence grievance formation (Fox 1999a). Where it is legitimate, faith can be used by both governments and dissidents to justify their causes. Furthermore, Haynes (1994) and Juergensmeyer (1993) claim that many Third World governments' lack of legitimacy allow dissidents to employ religious legitimacy in the fight against the regime. Where religion is a legitimate instrument, leaders will have more forums to spread their word and a larger audience, and only where religion is legitimate will religious leaders be able to function as coordinators. Additionally, they will induce more trust if this is the case. Problems of coordination and time-consistency should, therefore, be overcome more easily.

H5: In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious legitimacy leads to more intense conflicts, *ceteris paribus*.

Religious legitimacy will arguably lead to the use of religion as a rallying point, as an identifier of in- and out-groups, and perhaps as an instrument of demonizing and dehumanizing adversaries. This increases the gap between the parties and reinforces the problem of credible commitment. As discussed above, it is undoubtedly harder to trust foes after being portrayed as a demon or as vermin. Hence:

H6: In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious legitimacy leads to longer conflicts, *ceteris paribus*.

3.2.6 Religious demography

Previous studies disagree on the impact of demographic variables on conflict intensity and duration (see chapter 2). Can a population's demographic composition influence on conflict dynamics? A common assumption is that highly fractionalized societies will be especially conflict-ridden as diversity should promote cultural tensions. The index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) is commonly used in this manner (Akdede *et al.* 2008; Mauro 1995). An opposing view has been proposed by Collier *et al.* (2005: 7), who consider a high degree of fractionalization to impede mobilization. Following Collier and associates, I expect societies highly fractionalized regarding religion to be hard to mobilize. As fractionalized societies arguably are less cohesive than non-fractionalized ones, coordination and trust may be reduced, making coordination and time-consistency problems harder to overcome.

However, countries are rarely highly fractionalized regarding religion. Religious polarization may be more relevant. In a highly polarized community, consisting of two evenly sized groups, religion may easily become an overriding source of identification, especially in countries experiencing religious conflict. Furthermore, in demographically polarized societies perceptions of 'us' and 'them' become more apparent. It may also strengthen trust in leaders of the 'right' religion and reduce trust

in adherents of the ‘wrong’ faith. This should make it easier to overcome intragroup problems and thus ease the mobilization process.

H7a: In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious fractionalization reduces intensity levels, *ceteris paribus*.

H7b: In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious polarization increases intensity levels, *ceteris paribus*.

Fractionalization may ease problems of intergroup trust, because people are used to live among persons of other faiths. They may be accustomed to live peacefully side by side with adherents of other traditions as well as to governments who adhere to a faith other than one’s own. In religiously polarized societies visions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ will reduce intergroup trust and reinforce the credible commitment problem. Hence:

H8a: In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious fractionalization leads to shorter conflicts, *ceteris paribus*.

H8b: In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious polarization leads to longer conflicts, *ceteris paribus*.

In sum, eight hypotheses have been stated. Chapter 5 discusses the findings and examines how well these hypotheses are in accordance with the data. But first I will turn to the research design and account for the methods used to reach these results.

4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

*You slaughter living beings and call it religion:
hey brother, what would irreligion be?
“Great Saint” – that’s how you love to greet each other:
Who then would you call a murderer?*
(Kabir cited in Hawley & Juergensmeyer 1988: 51).

Every research project should contribute to the accumulation of knowledge, in order to ‘construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world’ (King *et al.* 1994: 15). The research design is a detailed plan of the methods of inquiry used on the way to reach valid inferences about such aspects of the world, and it involves elements of data collection and analytical tools. In this thesis, inferences should relate to the stated research question and hypotheses.

This chapter begins with a presentation of the analytical model. Next, it looks at the research design, including units of analysis and the applied statistical methods. Chosen operationalizations of variables and their alternatives are then discussed, together with assessments of their validity and reliability. The operationalization of my own religious cleavage variable is especially thoroughly discussed. Finally, methodological challenges, such as data availability and missing values and the consequences these have for reliability, are discussed.

4.1 The model

The main purpose of this analysis is to establish whether or not religious cleavages can contribute to explain variations in the two dependent variables, conflict intensity and duration. In addition, the analysis will uncover how other aspects of religion impacts on religious conflict. It will not be focused on how covariates affect each other. The model is illustrated in figure 1. This shows that religious cleavages is the main explanatory variable, and religious discrimination, legitimacy, and demography are expected to impact both on the effect of religious cleavages and directly on conflict intensity and duration.

Figure 1: The model

Figure 1a: Hypothesized effect on intensity





Figure 1b: Hypothesized effect on duration



4.2 Research design

4.2.1 Units of Analysis

Different units of analysis have been considered for the intensity analysis. Three alternatives stand out: conflict-years, country-years, and conflicts. A conflict-years design have an advantage over country-years as internationalized internal conflicts will count as a single conflict, whereas a country-years design will code conflicts which have spread across borders as more than one. Country-years are thus considered inferior to conflict-years for the purposes of this thesis.

A conflict-years design may have the disadvantage of only selecting cases with a certain value on the dependent variable. Although this problem primarily applies to studies of conflict onset, it is relevant here as well. Whereas including cases where no conflict is present would make little sense in this case, a slight selection bias is present due to the 25 battle-related deaths criterion, excluding conflicts with very low intensity levels. Thus, this study suffers from truncated variation, limiting ‘observations to less than the full range of variation ... that exists in the real world’ (King *et al.* 1994: 130). Assuming that H1 is correct, implying that religious conflicts are more intense, a consequence may be that non-religious conflicts are under-represented in the dataset.

Also, this leads to conflicts being coded as terminated when the number of battle-related deaths falls below 25 in a single year. If the 25 battle-related deaths threshold is reached again the following year it is coded as the beginning of a new conflict. It would be preferable to include conflicts with lower intensity levels to avoid these problems, but data availability precludes this possibility. This type of selection effect tends to underestimate results (*ibid.*: 139). The main alternative to the 25 battle-deaths threshold is a higher one. A commonly used barrier is 1,000 battle-deaths. The fact that this would further aggravate selection bias regarding intensity is evident.

Lacina (2006) and Nordås (2007) both analyze the total number of battle-related deaths using conflicts as units. Such a design differs from conflict-years as the latter make use of annually coded data, whereas the former applies aggregated data. In theory, such a design could lessen the selection bias by including cases that, for example, reach 25 battle-related deaths in total throughout the conflict. However, due to limited data availability this is currently not an option. Although a conflict design can make use of annual deaths, it still loses a lot of information compared to conflict-years. When all fatalities are summed into a total number, even more information is lost. Furthermore, a study of the total deaths in a conflict is not, in fact, restricted to intensity. Rather, the total number of deaths is a function of intensity and duration. A high number of deaths could be the result of a protracted low-intensity conflict as well as a short-lived high-intensity conflict. Although such studies are interesting, this is not the subject of this thesis. In comparison, conflict-years measure the number of deaths in a limited time span, disregarding duration. Conflict-years are in sum considered the best choice for my purposes and are chosen as units of analysis. Episodes are counted as conflict-years when the above stated criteria for civil wars (see section 1.1) are satisfied during a single calendar year. Hence, at least 25 battle-related related deaths must occur in a conflict between the government and one or more opposition groups between January 1 and December 31 in one year. With this definition it follows that some units, where a conflict began and/or terminated during the year, consist of partial years.

Intensity data are from Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming), who base their data on Lacina & Gleditsch (2005). Their dataset consists of 1,103 conflict-years that fulfil the

UCDP/PRIO conflict criteria.¹⁷ Only one unit is registered in a country in a single year, even when a country has two or more separate ongoing conflicts. This has its advantages and disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that it may obfuscate the presence of religious cleavages and, hence, lose validity. For instance, if there are two conflict-dyads, one with a religious cleavage and the other without, operating in the same country in the same year, these are joined into one unit. This will attenuate results and reduce the chances for significant results. Where this is the case the conflict-year is treated as one with a religious cleavage. This is a rare situation, but it occurs in, for example, Angola and India. The advantage is increased reliability. Separating the conflicts would no doubt lead to less precise data. Indeed, it is often hard to separate rebel groups, both for the government and for researchers, and separating conflict-dyads risks registering a substantial number of fatalities in the wrong conflict. This is obvious in terrorist attacks where perpetrators often are unidentified. If the government have multiple fronts, how can it be decided which opposition group was responsible for a bomb if none assume responsibility? What if multiple groups take credit?

Duration is analyzed using conflicts as units of analysis. The battle-deaths threshold has consequences here as well as a conflict is considered terminated if 'merely' 24 people are killed in one calendar year. Duration data are from Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming), based on Gates & Strand (2006). Their dataset contains 275 conflicts. In this dataset, different conflicts existing in the same year in the same country are separated. Still, cooperating rebel groups who together constitute a single front against the government are not separated into different conflicts. With this coding scheme, it is not uncommon that governments are coded to be involved in multiple conflicts in a single year. Separating the conflicts is less problematic with duration data, as it is easier to decide when a group involves itself in conflict and when it stops fighting than it is to decide, for example, which of several different groups were

¹⁷ The dataset originally consists of 1,166 intrastate conflict-years. However, 61 of these do not fulfil the criterion of 25 battle-related deaths. Two more conflict-years (registered in the USA in 2001 and 2002) are removed from the dataset as they do not identify insurgents and thereby inhibit coding of the main explanatory variable.

responsible for a terrorist attack. Previously terminated conflicts, that are restarted, count as new units.

4.2.2 Statistical Methods

For the analysis of intensity, simultaneous ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is applied. This assumes a linear relationship between independent and dependent variables. Hence, it is assumed that the effect of increasing an independent variable, X , with one unit of measurement has the same effect on a dependent variable, Y , regardless of X 's level (Skog 2004: 216). For instance, a one-point increase in religious discrimination (X) from 1 to 2 is presupposed to give the same increase (or decrease) in conflict intensity (Y) as an increase in discrimination from 37 to 38.¹⁸ OLS results in a regression line that ensures that the sum of squared errors (SSE) is minimized, and, hence, provides the best linear fit to data (*ibid.*: 222). Estimates obtained by OLS are unbiased, meaning that there is no systematic tendency for them to be high or low compared to the true empirical value (*ibid.*: 223). Generally, the OLS model can be written as

$$\tilde{Y}_i = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + \dots + b_kX_k + \varepsilon,$$

where \tilde{Y}_i is the predicted value on the dependent variable for unit i ; b_0 is the constant, giving predicted \tilde{Y}_i when all covariates have the value zero; b_1 is the regression coefficient for independent variable X_1 ; and ε is a residual expressing unobserved variation.

OLS regression assumes that data have certain characteristics. As already mentioned, it assumes linearity. In addition, homoscedasticity, normality, and the absence of autocorrelation are important assumptions in all linear regression. Homoscedasticity means that the variations around the regression line are distributed equally for all values on an independent variable (*ibid.*: 237). Normality refers to the normal distribution of residuals and the absence of outliers (*ibid.*: 249). Several variables are log-transformed in order to minimize violations of this precondition (see section 4.3). Autocorrelation concerns the independence of residuals (*ibid.*: 250). In

¹⁸ This may be modified by transforming the variables, for instance by logarithmic or quadric transformations.

this context an important point to make is that the level of violence in a given year cannot be seen apart from the level of violence in preceding years. The history of a conflict must be assumed to affect its characteristics. A lagged intensity variable is included to correct for this (see section 4.3.7). In multivariate regressions, an extra assumption is added. This is the absence of collinearity, which means approximately perfect correlation between covariates, and multicollinearity, which means that one independent variable is approximately a linear combination of two or more other independent variables (Christophersen 2006: 180). Identifying the relative importance of covariates is problematic when the correlation between them is high. Moreover, this leads to high standard errors, reducing the chances for significant results. Tests show that collinearity does occur when the two indicators of religious demography, fractionalization and polarization, are included in the same model. This is not a surprise, as they represent different operationalizations of the same concept (see section 4.3.6). To solve this problem, these indicators are used in separate analyses. Multicollinearity also appears when interaction and squared terms are included in the model. This problem has been minimized by centring these variables around mean values.¹⁹ It should be noted that this does not remove the problem of multicollinearity, but by treating the mean as the reference value, standard errors are reduced, thus enhancing the prospects for significant coefficients and easing interpretation. All other assumptions are fulfilled satisfactorily.

Duration is analyzed by applying a method called survival analysis.²⁰ The general idea behind this method is that it ‘consists of units ... observed at some natural starting point or time-of-origin. At the time-of-origin, the units are in some state ... and are observed over time. A unit, at any given point in the process is “at risk” of experiencing some event. An event represents a change or transition from one state to another state’ (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 7). In this context, the units are intrastate conflicts; the time-of-origin refers to conflict onset; the units are in the state

¹⁹ Indicators measuring religious discrimination, religious demography, level of development, resource wealth, and population size have been centred around mean values. For most indicators this procedure proved successful. However, for the indicator measuring religious discrimination tolerance values stayed relatively low (<0.2). I have tried centring around other central values. This did not improve tolerance values. Consequently, I keep the mean centred indicator, which is the one that performs best.

²⁰ Survival analysis is also known as event history analysis, duration analysis, failure-time analysis, etc. (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 2).

of conflict (meeting the requirements of the UCDP/PRIO definition (see section 1.1)); and the event that conflicts ‘risk’ is conflict termination (no longer meeting the requirements of the definition).²¹ Hence, what we are trying to observe is, on one side, the time of onset of intrastate conflicts and, on the other, whether and when intrastate conflicts are terminated. The goal of the analysis is to make ‘[i]nferences ... regarding the influence of the covariates on the ... duration’ (*ibid.*: 1), in other words, to understand why a conflict is terminated at a certain point in time.

Linear or loglinear methods suffer from two drawbacks compared to survival analysis. First, as the dataset is composed of conflict-years, observations will not be independent of each other. Unquestionably, the second year of conflict is contingent on the first. The assumption regarding autocorrelation will consequently be violated. Second, a special feature of survival analysis is its handling of units whose time-of-origin or event is unobserved. In this context this means that the onset or termination date is missing. If linear or loglinear regression is applied to such data, these cases will be handled as if onset and termination occurred on the first and last date of observation, respectively, and ‘then parameter estimates from a model treating the duration time as a function of covariates may be misleading (that is, the relationship between the covariates and the duration times may be under- or over-stated)’ (*ibid.*: 16). Survival analysis solves this problem through (left-) truncation and (right-) censoring. In practice, this disregards the unobserved history but still makes use of available information. This is preferable compared to excluding such cases and running a linear or loglinear regression, as this may produce a biased sample and thus misleading results (*ibid.*: 19).

Survival analysis gives a few different model specifications to choose between. I have chosen to apply the Cox proportional hazards model. This is the most widely used model for multivariate survival analysis (Skalická 2007: 207) and is well-suited for my needs. An advantage of this model is that it leaves the distributional form of duration times unspecified. Parametric models like Weibull and Gompertz, on the other hand, assume monotonic hazards (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 47). As the

²¹ The term ‘risk’ may seem odd in this context. It is a common term in survival analysis, however, as the method stems from biostatistics (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 7).

true distributional form here is unknown, the flexibility of the Cox model is favourable.

Cox regression treats duration as a continuous measure (Skalická 2007: 207). The hazard function for this model is

$$h_i(t) = \exp (b_1X_{1i} + b_2X_{2i} + \dots + b_kX_{ki}) h_0(t),$$

where $h_i(t)$ is the hazard rate at time t for unit i , b_1 is the regression parameter for the covariate X_1 , and $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard function (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 48-49). The hazard function gives the immediate risk of experiencing the event (conflict termination) at time t given that the unit (conflict) has survived until t (Skalická 2007: 207). The exponential part of the function depends on the values of covariates and their regression coefficients. When all covariates have the value 0, $h_i(t) = h_0(t)$. This baseline hazard is unspecified. Its shape is irrelevant and it can assume various shapes. Hence, the Cox regression has no constant (*ibid.*).

A special assumption for Cox regression is that of proportional hazards; that the ratio of two hazards is constant for all duration times. This assumption can be tested through the application of Harrell's rho, measuring the correlation between the rank of residuals and the rank of survival time (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 135). Evidence from Harrell's rho show non-proportionality for four indicators: religious cleavage, religious legitimacy, level of development, and resource wealth (see section 4.3 for more on the indicators). In order to correct for this, separate interaction terms between these indicators and the natural logarithm of survival time are included.²² One interaction term, concerning resource wealth, proved non-significant in the multivariate model. This is excluded, and proportionality is assumed for this variable.

4.3 Operationalizing the Variables

An important part of the research design is the operationalizations of variables. This is the process of making systematized concepts measurable through the development of indicators (Adcock & Collier 2001: 530-531). How variables are operationalized have

²² This solution is proposed by Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004: 136). Interaction terms using non-transformed expressions of time have been attempted, but they were less optimal in terms of likelihood.

fundamental implications for their validity and reliability. Validity refers to the correspondence between systematized concepts and operationalized indicators. This element is important because low validity may give systematic measurement error as something else than intended is measured (Ringdal 2001: 166-167). Reliability relates to the congruence between operationalized indicators and measured scores. High reliability means that ‘applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure’ (King *et al.* 1994: 25), and inhibits random measurement error (Adcock & Collier 2001: 531). These elements often needs to be balanced, as high validity may hurt reliability and vice versa. The term data’s validity is used to speak of the product of validity and reliability. This term refers to the correspondence between systematized concepts and measured scores and, hence, how well data is suited to illuminate the research question (Hellevik 2002: 52). In the following, validity and reliability will be discussed in conjunction with operationalizations. This section also accounts for data sources.

4.3.1 Dependent Variable: Intensity

This study examines two dependent variables. The first is the intensity of internal conflicts. As already indicated I focus on direct battle-related deaths. This includes civilian fatalities. However, intensity may also relate to indirect deaths from disease and illness or destruction of infrastructure. The reason these other elements are not included is their low reliability. Reliable data are in general hard to collect from conflict-torn countries. Governments have other, more important tasks, and international observers are often shut out. Even where observers are allowed to operate, they might be reluctant to or hindered from travelling to affected areas, or at the very least they will be careful to avoid the most dangerous situations. Indirect deaths and destruction of infrastructure are hard to measure even when observers are free and willing to operate in conflict zones. How should we measure the value of a destroyed hospital or road? And how can we separate indirect deaths from illness from those who would have occurred even without conflict? Because of such difficulties these elements of intensity are excluded from this analysis. The direct battle-related deaths operationalization also needs a discussion regarding reliability. Data are from

Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming) who base their battle-related deaths indicator on a best estimate. However, they have collected their data from Lacina & Gleditsch (2005) who include low and high estimates as well. Hence, the actual numbers of battle-related deaths are uncertain. Still, these are arguably the best available.

Is this operationalization a valid one? As already mentioned, indirect deaths and destruction of infrastructure, other elements of conflict intensity, are not measured. Nevertheless, I will argue that the battle-related deaths indicator is a valid proxy as conflicts with high numbers of indirect deaths and massive destruction of infrastructure normally will be characterized by high numbers of battle-related deaths as well, although this is not necessarily the case in every conflict. But what is really important is what the variable is meant to measure. The intention is not to include all aspects of society's costs of war. Rather, the intention is to capture variations in the level of violence and bloodiness. All in all, the battle-related deaths operationalization of conflict intensity is highly valid for this purpose.

This indicator is log transformed in order to minimize violations of the normality assumption. The same is done for independent variables that can be thought to have a linear impact on intensity. In this manner, the probability of obtaining significant results increases and so does R^2 (explained variation).

4.3.2 Dependent Variable: Duration

The other dependent variable is conflict duration. Again, it is a matter of finding the right balance of validity and reliability in order to maximize data's validity. Duration can be measured in days, months or years. Obviously, years would provide little precision, as a conflict that lasts from January 1 to December 31 would be coded the same way as a one hour long coup d'état. More detailed data are arguably more valid, as more information gives us more knowledge about the actual duration, improving the possibilities for significant results. However, more detailed data are less reliable. After all it is considerably easier to gather correct data on start and end years than start and end dates. Still, considering the vast media coverage of large conflicts and researchers' increased accessibility to first-hand witnesses, data has improved substantially. For this

reason I will argue that data's validity is maximized by using the most detailed data available.

Duration data are from Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming), based on Gates & Strand (2006). Start and end dates are here coded as precisely as possible.²³ Data differentiates between 'major' and 'minor' start and end dates. The former refers to the first and last date of violence, while the latter is the first and last dates where the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict definition of conflict is fulfilled. In line with my above definition of internal conflict, I use the latter.

Conflicts in the data that were initiated before 1946 or was still going on at the end of 2004 are censored. In my data, seven conflicts had broken out prior to January 1, 1946, and 28 conflicts were still running at the dataset's end date of December 31, 2004.

4.3.3 Measuring Religious Cleavages

The main explanatory variable concerns religious cleavages. This deserves extra attention. When operationalizing religious cleavages, there are two main alternatives. First, the issues of the conflict can be analysed, searching through documents and statements for the rebels' goals. In this case, a religious cleavage can be defined as a central religious incompatibility in the conflict. According to this definition it would be a religious conflict when the rebels actively seek a religious change of some sort, either by establishing or disestablishing a state religion, fighting religious discrimination, seceding to form a new state based on religious principles other than those in the existing state, or simply removing the 'infidel' incumbents. Second, the focus can be on the identity of the involved actors. This is the more common of the two alternatives (Nordås 2007: 8). In this case, there is a religious cleavage when the two parties belong to separate religions, when they adhere to different denominations of one religion, or when one side is religious and the other side not. Obviously the best operationalization is to include both issue- and identity-based cleavages. However, considering the lack of comprehensive sources and the temporal limitations of this

²³ The dataset also provides precision scores for each start and end date. For more on this, consult Gates & Strand's (2006) dataset and its readme-file, both available from <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Onset-and-Duration-of-Intrastate-Conflict/Duration-Data-v1-2006b/>.

thesis, collecting data on both issues and identities is too great a task. Therefore, a choice must be made. As indicated in the introduction, the choice has fallen on the identity-based definition. This choice needs justification.

First, are the two alternatives equally valid operationalizations of the concept religious cleavage? The former definition is the only one that catches whether or not religion actually is a cause or main element of the conflict. A struggle between parties of different religions might have nothing to do with religion *per se*. In fact it may be exclusively about politics or economics. Thus, the former might be considered a more valid operationalization of the underlying concept (*ibid.*: 8). Nevertheless, an identity-based definition may be better able to capture several important aspects. For instance, it is easier to establish a division of ‘us’ and ‘them’ when there is an identity-based cleavage. This is both because the groups have different belief-systems and because the division is more salient. As a consequence demonization and dehumanization is more likely to occur. Furthermore, the notion of religious institutions as arenas for mobilization may be more important in identity-based religious conflicts. In comparison, a religious leader trying to mobilize his community will more easily meet internal opposition among followers where there is an issue-based cleavage and not an identity-based one. Concerning duration, intergroup trust will arguably be easier to establish if there is only an issue-based cleavage as religious authorities on both sides may be respected by supporters of both sides.

The two approaches do occasionally diverge on the question of religious cleavage. An example is Algeria, where radical Sunni insurgents fight moderate, secular Sunni incumbents. An issue in the conflict is the role of religion in public life (Juergensmeyer 1993: 48, 168).²⁴ Still, the parties do not diverge on religious adherence; they are both Sunni Muslims. The identity-based approach here fails to capture the cleavage.

Second, the two approaches can be said to differ with respect to reliability. In order to assess whether or not there is an issue-based religious cleavage, it is necessary to search through a vast amount of speeches and scholarly work. This is a huge task

²⁴ It should be noted, however, that the role of religion in the Algerian conflict is contested (see for instance Schulhofer-Wohl 2007). The disagreement over the relevance of religious issues in Algeria demonstrates the inherent difficulties of an issue-based definition.

and different researchers do not necessarily have access to the same material. Additionally, it might also be necessary to interview central actors where text sources are scarce. A problem will occur where some recognize the conflict as a religious one while others claim that faith was of no importance. The ensuing coding process is to a considerable extent contingent upon the discretion of the coder. As a further complication, the use of religious rhetoric in arguments and appeals does not necessarily imply that religion is an important issue. This is where the identity-oriented approach has one of its strengths. Although not always crystal clear, the religious composition of the parties is more readily available, and whereas coders might assign different weights to different issues, they will arguably code religious affiliations more consistently. Additionally, information on identity is less likely to be biased. Many groups have an explicit religious profile. Those who do not are sometimes based in a certain region where most people adhere to a certain faith. This makes coding easier and more reliable for the latter approach.

A third and related issue is that data on identities are easier available than issue-data. This is because the identities of belligerents are more widely known than their goals. In order to know the objectives of a rebel group, you first need to know the group itself. Moreover, for many conflicts, especially those farthest back in time and the short-lived ones, little documentation is available and easily accessible. This has consequences for reliability.

Fourth, it is a question of costs. Examining the issues in a conflict may be highly time-intensive. And if interviews are needed because of scarce written sources, it may involve costly and time-consuming travels. Furthermore, it may be risky if one is to travel to conflict zones. In sum, data's validity for the identity-based definition is considered to be at least as high as for the issue-oriented definition. Moreover, the former suffers less from poor availability and high costs.

In order to identify religious cleavages, I have first coded the religious affiliations of the relevant groups and then decided whether or not fighting parties differ from each other. Conflicts with such a difference have been assigned the value 1, indicating the presence of a religious cleavage. Cases without a religious difference have been given the value 0. I have been open for a variety of religious traditions. In

total, 15 distinct values have been used, including a value for non-religious groups.²⁵ The assignment of values has been based on the following criteria. First, the government side was assigned a value based on the religious identity of the government or governing party as a whole when this was known. For instance, Israeli governments were coded Jewish. Where this was unclear it was examined whether the regime had a distinct ethnic or regional identity. If this was the case and the ethnic or regional group had a distinct religious affiliation, the regime was assigned a value according to this. Where the coding still was undetermined a value was assigned based on the head of government's religious adherence.

Similarly, rebel groups have been assigned a value based on their adherence where this was obvious. For instance, the Somali al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI) insurgents were coded Sunni and the so-called Sikhist insurgents in India were coded Sikhist. The remaining units were given values based on ethnicity or region where this was distinct and related to a specific religious affiliation – for example the Tibet insurgency in China has been coded 'Other/Mixed Buddhist' based on the beliefs of the vast majority of Tibetans (Tibetan Buddhism) – or based on the group's leaders. The latter is the case with, for example, coups d'état, where the identity of followers usually is unknown. An example is the attempted coup d'état in Cameroon in 1984. The rebels were supporters of former president Ahmadou Ahidjo. Ahidjo was a Sunni Muslim; hence the rebels are treated as Sunnis.

In several cases the rebel side was made up by more than one group and these did not always adhere to the same faith. In order to code a joint value to the rebel side, the religion of the plurality of the groups was assigned, disregarding the relative size of the groups. It would be favourable to take relative size into consideration, but such information is unreliable and unavailable for a number of groups. Where two religions were equally frequent, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch *et al.* 2002) and the COW Intra-State Wars dataset (Sarkees 2000) were used to identify the main group. The rebel side has then been assigned the value related to this group.

²⁵ These are: Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Other/Mixed Christian, Sunni, Shi'a, Other/Mixed Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Sikhist, Theravada, Other/Mixed Buddhist, Animist, Non-religious, and Other. In addition, I have considered values such as Jainist, Zoroastrian, Mayahana Buddhist, Shinto, Taoist, and Confucian.

In some cases the government is replaced in the course of the conflict or a rebel group joins or leaves an ongoing struggle, thus influencing the presence of religious cleavages as defined.²⁶ For the duration analysis, each conflict has been assigned one value for the entire conflict, based on the main actors. For the intensity analysis the value of this variable is allowed to change from year to year, something that is needed as different conflict-dyads are not differentiated (see section 4.2.1). Where a government fights several separate rebellions, the cleavage variable is assigned the value that is most frequent among these rebellions. Where the values (0s and 1s) are equally frequent, the unit is treated as one with a religious cleavage.

Not all people are religious believers. In the same manner as a cleavage may exist between different religious groups, a religious group and a non-religious group might see each other as adversaries. The same effects could, therefore, be expected where atheists fight a group with a distinct religious adherence. Communism is ideologically opposed to religion and communist regimes have sought to eradicate organized religion (Barro & McCleary 2005: 1344). According to Bukharin & Preobrazhensky, '[s]cientific communism, in its judgements concerning natural phenomena, is guided by the data of the natural sciences, which are in irreconcilable conflict with all religious imaginings' (1969: 300). Consequently, '[r]eligion and communism are incompatible, both theoretically and practically' (*ibid.*: 299) and a Communist that 'continues to cling to his religious faith ... ceases thereby to be a communist' (*ibid.*: 300). Ergo, Communist governments and rebel groups are coded non-religious.

A variety of sources – publications, online sources and personal communication – have been consulted. Among the most frequently used sources are publications from DeRouen & Heo (2007) and U.S. Department of State (2008); datasets from Fox (2008), Roeder (2003), and Svensson (2007a); as well as HighBeam Encyclopedia (2008). These are all considered highly reliable.²⁷ Where these proved insufficient, I

²⁶ In order to assess whether or not this influenced the findings, an alternative coding based allowing for varying values has been included. The results did not change significantly. These results are not reported.

²⁷ HighBeam Encyclopedia (2008) is a collection of articles from reliable encyclopedias such as Britannica and Columbia as well as various newspapers and magazines. As Svensson (2007a) does not include a non-religious category, information from his dataset is not used separately without a wide search for such information. The utilized datasets are available at the following URLs: Fox (2008) at

have consulted other publications or contacted country experts. Additionally, some online sources considered less reliable have been consulted. The latter are not regarded sufficient alone; rather they are used for verification purposes. For a detailed listing of sources used in different cases, see appendix A and the associated reference list.²⁸

Missing data is generally a problem for studies of violent conflict. This is so also for this project. I have been unable to identify whether or not a religious cleavage was present in 34 conflicts in 18 different countries. This leaves me with 241 conflicts for the duration analysis and 1,035 conflict-years for the intensity analysis.

4.3.4 Religious Discrimination

This variable is intended to capture state discrimination against some or all religions. Data on religious discrimination is taken from Jonathan Fox's Religion and State (RAS) dataset.²⁹ Two RAS indicators are utilized here. First, there is an indicator measuring the degree of discrimination against minority religions on a scale going from 0 to 48. This is a composite variable summing up the values for 16 different types of discrimination, each measured on a scale going from 0 to 3 (Fox 2004a: 5-7). The second indicator measures the degree of discrimination against the majority or all religions. This is included to get a grasp of religious discrimination in general, such as may be present in Communist countries, and is 'qualitatively different from restrictions on minority religions' (*ibid.*: 7). The second indicator goes from 0 to 33, and is a composite of 11 types of discrimination measured on a four-level scale similar to that of the first indicator (*ibid.*: 7-8). Values on the two indicators have been added into a single additive index, giving a total range of 0 to 81 where 81 is maximum discrimination and 0 represents no religious discrimination. This seems more reasonable than to weigh the two, as they both are made from a sum of variables measured on a similar scale.³⁰

<http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/downloads.html>; Roeder (2003) at <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/data.htm>; and Svensson (2007a) at <http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/full/51/6/930/DC1>.

²⁸ Throughout the coding process I have made an effort at triangulation of sources. In a few cases where only one source has been found, coding is based on this if the source is considered highly reliable and no contradictory information is found. Where information from the highly reliable sources is missing, unclear, or contradictory, values are treated as missing.

²⁹ Available at: <http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/downloads.html>.

³⁰ For a detailed account of the included types of discrimination, see Fox (2004a).

This is considered a highly valid indicator of religious discrimination. It includes a broad range of discriminating acts and policies. Reliability is also considered to be high. Throughout the process of coding, the project director has supervised coders to ensure that they use the same methodology and criteria. Furthermore, about one fourth of the states have been recoded by another coder to ensure objective coding (*ibid.*: 1).

Fox's data cover the period 1990-2002. Since changes from year to year are relatively rare, and where they occur they tend to be marginal, I have extrapolated the data through the entire period covered by my data. Four countries, constituting 23 conflict-years, still have missing values after this operation, as these ceased to exist prior to 1990.³¹ These have been assigned the variable's mean value.³² These operations increase the prospects for significant results. Still, such operations may have unfortunate effects. In order to assess the chances for skewed results, the stability of discrimination values have been examined. Results show that a vast majority of countries have unchanged values throughout the twelve-year period (see appendix B).

This indicator has been centred to minimize violations of normality. As religious discrimination might impact differently on religious and non-religious conflicts an interaction term is also included.

4.3.5 Religious Legitimacy

Religious legitimacy is hard to measure directly. A proxy should account for whether or not religion is used in public debate. Following Fox (2000a) I use the presence of an official state religion as an operational definition. Values for each year has been decided based on whether or not a state religion was present at the beginning of the year. The variable is dichotomous. Units with a state religion are given the value 1, while those without a state religion are assigned the value 0. Data is collected from

³¹ These are Arab Republic of Yemen, People's Republic of Yemen, Muscat and Oman, and Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). In sum, these make out six conflicts and 24 conflict-years.

³² As mentioned below, the same has been done for some of the control variables. For each variable where this is done, a dummy variable has been added to control for potential effects from this operation. For the dummy variable, units with an original missing value are coded 1 and other units are coded 0. For more on this, see section 4.4.

Barrett (1982), Barrett *et al.* (2001), Nordås (2004b), and U.S. Department of State (2008).

The validity of this variable requires discussion. Religious legitimacy can be said to consist of more elements than whether or not there is an official religion. Still, this does to a large degree capture how legitimate religion is in the polity as a whole. Moreover, it captures the fact that Communist states, which are ideologically opposed to religion, are atheist. The main problem lies at the local level. Even in Communist states there may be smaller communities where religion is considered highly legitimate in public debate, and in such communities religion might be used in the mobilization process. An advantage of this indicator is its reliability. The presence of state religions is normally obvious and not dependent on individual discretion. More detailed proxies, considering local communities and other aspects of religion in public life, would arguably suffer under reliability. In sum, data's validity is considered acceptable. This variable has no missing values.

An interaction term is included as religious legitimacy may affect religious and non-religious conflict differently.

4.3.6 Religious Demography

In order to capture different aspects of religious demography one index of religious fractionalization and one of religious polarization is included. Formulas for the indices are taken from Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005). The former is based on the following formula:

$$FRAC = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N \pi_i^2 = \sum_{i=1}^N \pi_i(1 - \pi_i)$$

where π_i is the proportion of people that belong to the religious group i and N is the total number of groups (*ibid.*: 797). This index is interpreted as the probability that two randomly drawn people from a given population belong to different religious groups.

Religious polarization is calculated from the following formula:

$$RQ = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{1/2 - \pi_i}{1/2} \right)^2 \pi_i = 4 \sum_{i=1}^N \pi_i^2 (1 - \pi_i).$$

This index is meant to capture how far a population is from a bipolar distribution (*ibid.*: 798). Both indices range from 0 to 1, where 1 is maximum fractionalization and maximum polarization, respectively. Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (*ibid.*) also include scores on religious fractionalization and polarization in most of the countries in my data. However, their classification of religions differs from the one used to measure religious cleavages in this thesis. For instance, their data do not differentiate between different branches of Christianity. Hence, the scores are not entirely commensurable. For this reason I choose to use data from the RAS dataset, which measures the proportion of populations adhering to 16 different religious traditions. These denominations are very similar to those included in my classification scheme.³³ The RAS data is then used to calculate scores of religious fractionalization and polarization, using the above formulas.

After adding data that suits my needs, both indices are considered valid operationalizations. The RAS data are collected from Barrett (1982), Barrett *et al.* (2001) and the CIA World Factbook (Fox 2004c), sources generally considered highly reliable and widely used. Only Yemen (including the former North and South) has missing values. This has been corrected using information on the country's demographics from U.S. Department of State (2008) and NationMaster.com (2008).

As for legitimacy a problem is that religious fractionalization and polarization are macro measures relating to the population as a whole, not only to the fighting parties or their local communities. When belligerents recruit soldiers they may focus on a particular region, and the rest of the country is then of little relevance. This points to the importance of geography and scope in civil wars. For the time being, more

³³ The RAS dataset includes Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, other Christians, Sunnis, Shi'ites, other Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Animists, Confucians, Sikhs, Bahá'í, non-religious, and others for 174 states and areas. Additionally, different types of Protestantism are separated. In my data I have used aggregate numbers of Protestantism as this makes the classification comparable to the coding of cleavages.

specified indicators are not available.³⁴ As characteristics of the population are expected to influence conflict dynamics, these indicators are used as the best available proxies.

These indices have been centred to minimize violations of normality. An interaction term is included for religious cleavages and each of the two variables on religious demography. A squared term for polarization is included in the duration analysis.³⁵

4.3.7 Control Variables

Control variables are included in order to hold possible confounding factors constant and ensure that findings are not simply due to spurious relationships. With the introduction of control variables the impact of the explanatory variables can be evaluated for specific control groups (Skog 2004: 44). This breaks the bivariate correlations down into partial correlations, and only then can we establish actual impacts.

First, an indicator of regime type is included. Democracies have legitimate and institutionalized manners to resolve conflict and are better able to respond to challenges without resorting to massive use of violence. This should make conflicts in democracies less intense than in other countries, because ‘autocracies and non-democratic new nations, on the other hand, typically follow policies of deadly response to both protest and rebellion’ (Lichbach & Gurr cited in Benson & Kugler 1998: 198, n. 1). Furthermore, democratic institutions should theoretically be better able to end civil war through negotiations and non-violent means. In comparison, autocratic regimes lack credible institutions that might induce trust between the parties. Data on regime type are taken from Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming). The chosen indicator is based on the Polity IV project. The Polity index scores regimes on a 21-point scale, ranging from +10 to -10. The score is found by subtracting the value on an autocracy scale (0-10) from the value on a democracy scale (0-10) (Marshall & Jaggers 2000:

³⁴ A group of researchers at PRIO are working to improve such indicators to consider geography, scope, and local factors. See for instance Buhaug & Gates (2002), Buhaug & Lujala (2005), Buhaug *et al.* (2008), and Rød & Buhaug (2008).

³⁵ Squared terms have been tested for both indicators in both analyses, but only this proved significant.

14). Hence, fully democratic states are scored +10 and fully autocratic states -10. For the purposes of this study, the Polity score suits the requirements well, as it offers a way to differentiate between more and less democratic states. A squared expression of this indicator is also included, in order to reveal a possible non-linear relationship.³⁶ The indicator has missing values in 114 and 185 country-years for the intensity and duration³⁷ analyses, respectively. These have been replaced by mean values. The indicator is centred to minimize violations of normality.

A country's level of development might be influential. In rich countries the government army has more resources and is better equipped than in poor countries. Theoretically, this should enhance the regime's ability to repel insurrections, thus leading to short-lived wars. Considering intensity, warring parties in rich countries will arguably be well equipped and able to inflict much damage. The level of development is measured by an indicator of average GDP per capita. Data are taken from Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming). This is a macro measure, and thus not as precise as one could wish. Still, more precise data is non-existent and this indicator is considered reasonably valid for the purposes. GDP per capita is objective data, and although it may be hard to collect such information in certain countries, it is considered to be of high reliability. As the effect from this indicator on the dependent variables may be thought to be non-linear, a squared term is tested but proved non-significant. 52 country-years have missing values in the intensity analysis and 142 in the duration analysis. These have been replaced by mean values. The indicator is centred to minimize violations of normality. In the intensity analysis, this indicator is log transformed in order to minimize residuals and increase R^2 .

Resource wealth is commonly linked to conflict duration. Especially, the link from drugs and gems is pronounced in certain case studies. Such lootable resources may give insurgents a source of stable income and can help overcome the collective action problem through greed-based motivation by inciting private incentives through side-payments. These resources are often hard for the government to control, particularly when they exist in peripheral areas. The most valid operationalization, the

³⁶ This proved non-significant in the duration analysis and is therefore not included in the reported regressions.

³⁷ Missing values for the duration analysis is here reported in country-years, not conflicts. This is due to the construction of the dataset. The missing values are scattered among most of the conflicts.

actually existing resource deposits, is not available further back than 1989 (de Soysa 2002). Besides, the reliability of such a variable can be questioned as the shadow economy market value of deposits is unsure. Therefore, the proportion of primary commodity exports of GDP is used as a proxy for natural resource availability. This indicator is able to capture both lootable resources, which may be important for rebels, and petroleum, which typically is under government control. Both these aspects are relevant as they provide important sources of revenue for the warring parties. Data are taken from Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005). Their data comprise 98 countries over eight five-year periods between 1960 and 1999. Values have been extrapolated cover the whole period examined here, 1946-2004. As changes between five-year periods are modest, this should not cause large problems. In one case a five-year period is missing between periods with registered data. For this period, the mean of the preceding and succeeding period has been inserted. Muscat and Oman have been given a value from Oman and the former Yemeni republics have been assigned values from the Republic of Yemen. For 19 other states with missing values, data from the World Trade Organization has been used to calculate the share of agricultural and mineral exports as a share of GDP. Five countries needed further information, which has been collected from the CIA World Factbook, the International Trade Centre (ITC), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).³⁸ A squared term is added to capture possible non-linear effects.³⁹ In the intensity analysis this variable is log transformed in order to reduce residuals. This indicator is centred to reduce violations of normality.

For the intensity analysis, three more variables are included. First, a variable measuring the number of conflicts, as it is reasonable to assume that countries experiencing several simultaneous conflicts will have more battles and a higher number of battle-related deaths in a given year. Furthermore, I control for the countries' total population size. The rationale behind this is that a conflict may kill

³⁸ The numbers from WTO, ITC, and UNDP are from 2006, while CIA World Factbook data are from 2007. I have performed tests on nine countries, and found that using these alternative data provide results very similar to Montalvo & Reynal-Querol's (2005) data. Hence, I find it reasonable to assume that the additional data sources provide comparable numbers. Applied data are available at the following locations: WTO at <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFHome.aspx?Language=E>, CIA at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, ITC at <http://www.intracen.org/menus/countries.htm>, and UNDP at http://www.nsc.gov.la/Products/NHDR%202006/NHDR2006_Eng.pdf

³⁹ This proved non-significant, and is consequently dropped, in the intensity analysis.

more people if there are more people to be killed. This variable is log transformed. Data are taken from Gleditsch *et al.* (forthcoming). The final variable is a lagged battle-deaths indicator, measuring the intensity in the preceding year. This is log transformed as well in order to reduce residuals. Neglecting to include such a control variable would break with the assumption regarding autocorrelation, as intensity levels are likely to depend on preceding intensity levels. These three variables are all centred around their mean values.

4.4 Methodological challenges

Quantitative analyses frequently encounter difficulties of missing data. Countries in conflict are especially troublesome in this regard. This study also suffers from missing data. In total, 34 conflicts and 68 conflict-years are lost due to missing data on the main explanatory variable. To avoid further loss, missing data on other variables are replaced through extrapolation or by the mean score of the relevant variable. After this procedure 241 conflicts remain for the duration analysis and 1,035 conflict-years for the intensity analysis. According to Christophersen (2006: 175) there should be around ten to twenty units for each covariate to achieve meaningful testing of regression coefficients. This criterion is fulfilled. Still, a problem will arise if the units with missing data systematically differ from other units concerning their values on the dependent variables. Is this the case here? The conflicts with missing values are spread among 18 different countries. Two of them stand out as long-lasting conflicts, both in Uganda, lasting 4,018 and 6,493 days, respectively. The other conflicts with missing data are relatively short. Precisely this, the short duration, may be a reason for many of the missing values. Less is written on the shorter conflicts, and this makes the belligerents' religious affiliations harder to identify. Running a survival analysis reveals that conflicts with missing value on the cleavage variable are significantly shorter than other conflicts. However, there is no reason to believe that these units should differ from others regarding religious cleavages. If the hypotheses are correct, these conflicts, being shorter than other conflicts, should have a lower share of religious cleavages than other conflicts. Moreover, there is less of a reason to account for religion and religious affiliation in reports from conflicts without a religious

cleavage than from those with such a cleavage and this may be a cause of missing data. Concerning the intensity analysis a bivariate linear regression shows that conflict-years with missing cleavage values do not differ significantly from other conflict-years.

This study includes several states that no longer exist, such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Vietnam. This is due both to the dissolution of empires and the unification of states into new entities. In some cases, data from these former states have proved hard to collect. An example is Muscat and Oman, a country existing between 1856 and 1970. In order to reduce problems of missing data, these countries have in some cases received values stemming from succeeding state formations. Another strategy applied to reduce the problem of missing data is replacement by the mean score of the variable in question. This is advantageous for the analysis as it increases the number of observations and reduces standard errors. On certain indicators units with missing values may differ systematically from other units. For instance, poor and authoritarian countries may be over-represented among units with missing values. However, assuming the distribution of these units around the regression line is similar to the distribution of other units, this is not a problem as long as regression coefficients remain relatively unchanged. Running alternative analyses, using the original indicators, results show that changes in coefficients are small where they at all occur. The use of the recoded indicators is consequently considered preferable. Still, to control for potential effects from the replacement of missing values in the multivariate analyses, a dummy variable measuring the prevalence of original missing values is added for every variable where this has been done.

4.5 Data Summary

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all the included variables. It includes two dependent variables, one main and four other explanatory variables, and a number of control variables. Due to the structure of the dataset, the number of observations in table 1b differs from what is mentioned above.⁴⁰ After replacing missing values with mean scores, $N=1,035$ for the intensity analysis. For the duration analysis $N=241$, in total constituting 1,528 conflict-years.

⁴⁰ The dataset is based on conflict-years, whereas conflicts are the units of analysis.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all included variables

Table 1a: Descriptive statistics for variables in the intensity analysis

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.
<i>Battle Deaths (ln)</i>	1103	3.22	12.77	6.65	1.86
<i>Religious Cleavage</i>	1035	0	1	0.68	0.47
<i>Religious Discrimination</i>	1079	0	46	10.44	11.86
<i>Cleavage * Discrimination</i>	1031	0	44	7.47	11.53
<i>Religious Legitimacy</i>	1103	0	1	0.34	0.47
<i>Cleavage * Legitimacy</i>	1092	0	1	0.20	0.40
<i>Religious Fractionalization</i>	1103	0.01	0.75	0.36	0.20
<i>Cleavage * Fractionalization</i>	1035	0	0.75	0.26	0.23
<i>Religious Polarization</i>	1103	0.01	0.96	0.55	0.26
<i>Cleavage * Polarization</i>	1035	0	0.92	0.40	0.32
<i>Regime Type</i>	971	-10	10	-0.50	6.93
<i>Regime Type (sq)</i>	971	0	100	48.27	28.38
<i>GDP per capita (ln)</i>	1040	3.87	9.97	7.08	1.09
<i>GDP per capita (ln)(sq)</i>	1040	14.99	99.31	51.30	15.42
<i>Primary comm. exp./GDP (ln)</i>	1093	-5.12	-0.07	-2.53	0.95
<i>Primary comm. exp./GDP (ln)(sq)</i>	1093	0.01	26.17	7.31	5.19
<i>Population size (ln)</i>	1040	5.33	13.83	9.71	1.37
<i>Population size (ln)(sq)</i>	1040	28.38	191.31	96.17	27.65
<i>Lagged Battle Deaths (ln)</i>	1103	0	12.77	5.66	3.03
<i>Number of conflicts (ln)</i>	1103	0	1.95	0.18	0.43
<i>Valid N (listwise)</i>	857				

Table 1b: Descriptive statistics for variables in the duration analysis

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.
<i>Duration</i>	1610	1	20454	3318.65	3596.63
<i>Religious Cleavage</i>	1528	0	1	0.66	0.48
<i>Religious Discrimination</i>	1586	0	46	13.34	13.26
<i>Cleavage * Discrimination</i>	1529	0	44	8.40	12.29
<i>Religious Legitimacy</i>	1610	0	1	0.27	0.44
<i>Cleavage * Legitimacy</i>	1596	0	1	0.14	0.35
<i>Religious Fractionalization</i>	1610	0.01	0.75	0.34	0.18
<i>Cleavage * Fractionalization</i>	1528	0	0.75	0.24	0.22
<i>Religious Polarization</i>	1610	0.01	0.96	0.53	0.23
<i>Cleavage * Polarization</i>	1528	0	0.92	0.37	0.31
<i>Regime Type</i>	1402	-10	10	-0.39	7.05
<i>Regime Type (sq)</i>	1402	0	100	49.83	26.58
<i>GDP per capita</i>	1453	48	21281.78	1864.44	2377.11
<i>GDP per capita (sq)</i>	1453	2304	452914159.97	9122921.00	30991422.58
<i>Primary comm. exp./GDP</i>	1600	0.01	0.93	0.11	0.11
<i>Primary comm. exp./GDP (sq)</i>	1600	0.00	0.87	0.02	0.06
<i>Valid conflict-years (listwise)</i>	1241				

5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

[I]t is customary for Buddhist monks to bless the army, for example at pirit ceremonies at Panagoda Sri Maha Bodhirajaramaya, an army temple on military grounds ... Furthermore, blessing ceremonies for the protection of the army, conducted by famous Buddhist monks, are often shown on national television (Frydenlund 2005: 18).

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first two sections present the findings. Bivariate regressions are presented in the first section. Section 5.2, constituting the main part of this chapter, presents and analyzes multivariate results. In the last section the main findings are summed up and discussed in light of the applied theory.

5.1 Bivariate Results

Religion and religious cleavages are commonly promoted as explanations of violence. Are such explanations accurate or merely oversimplifications? In order to evaluate this, bivariate results, which themselves may be considered simplifications as they do not control for other impacts, are presented first. These findings are then compared with multivariate results. Bivariate results are presented in table 2. Largely, coefficients indicate support for the main hypotheses, that conflicts with religious cleavages are bloodier and longer-lasting.

Regarding intensity three estimates are listed. The regression coefficient, b_k , is the parameter estimate. This expresses how the dependent variable is influenced by the independent variable, and holds two types of information. First, a positive regression coefficient means there is a positive relationship. In other words an increase in the independent variable is estimated to give an increase in the dependent variable. Negative coefficients, on the other hand, signify negative relationships, meaning that an increase in the independent variable is estimated to give a decrease in the dependent variable. Second, the size of the parameter estimate reflects how many units of measure the dependent variable changes when the independent variable is increased by one unit of measure. $SE(b_k)$ represents the standard error of the parameter estimate. This is the standard deviation of the parameter's probability distribution. Standard errors express how much sampling fluctuation a statistic will show. Thus, it indicates how much the estimate may deviate from the parameter's true value (Skog 2004: 135).

Based on the two preceding statistics, a p -score is calculated. This represents the probability of obtaining the reported parameter estimate (b_k) if there is no relationship between the independent and dependent variables. This is related to the notion of statistical significance. In general, results are regarded significant when the p -score is sufficiently low. However, how low they should be is a matter of personal choice. A strong requirement lowers the risk of committing a type I error, which is to falsely conclude there is a relationship between the variables. At the same time it raises the risk of a type II error, which is to falsely conclude there is no relationship (*ibid.*: 103). Type I errors are generally considered to be the more serious of the two (Hellevik 2002: 390). The probability of committing a type I error equals the level of significance, while the probability of committing a type II error is contingent on three factors: the level of significance, the selection size, and the true distribution of the population of units (Skog 2004: 207). In the following, I apply 5% as the required level of significance, equivalent to $p=0.050$.

Table 2: Bivariate regression results

	Intensity			Duration			
	<i>b</i>	SE(<i>b</i>)	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	SE(<i>b</i>)	<i>p</i>	exp(<i>b</i>)
<i>Religious Cleavage</i>	0.341	0.121	0.005	-0.690	0.138	0.000	0.501
<i>Religious Discrimination</i>	0.020	0.005	0.000	-0.006	0.005	0.205	0.994
<i>Religious Legitimacy</i>	-0.218	0.118	0.066	0.058	0.142	0.682	1.060
<i>Religious Fractionalization</i>	1.305	0.288	0.000	1.424	0.349	0.000	4.152
<i>Religious Polarization</i>	1.055	0.217	0.000	0.828	0.285	0.004	2.288

The religious cleavage indicator has a positive and significant coefficient in the intensity analysis, meaning that conflicts with a religious cleavage on average kill more people than conflicts with no such cleavage. For the religious cleavage indicator, the b -score is 0.341. How is this interpreted? First of all, it is a positive value, signifying a positive relationship. Hence, when the religious cleavage value is increased from 0 (no cleavage) to 1 (cleavage), conflict intensity is expected to increase. In this case, the dependent variable (the natural logarithm of battle-related deaths) is expected to increase by 0.341 units of measure. It is found that religious conflicts on average kill 40.6% more people in a single conflict-year, constituting 241

more people in an average conflict.⁴¹ A p -value of 0.005 is highly significant; the probability of committing a type I error is merely 0.5%. This result supports hypothesis 1. Other religious indicators also perform well. Increasing religious discrimination, fractionalization, or polarization predicts higher levels of intensity. This may be taken as support for hypotheses 3 and 7b, whereas hypothesis 7a is not supported. Religious legitimacy has a negative coefficient not obtaining the chosen level of significance.


Considering duration, the b_k coefficient contains information regarding the hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 59). The hazard rate ‘describes the risk a unit incurs of having a spell or duration end in some period, given that the spell has lasted up to or beyond some length of time’ (*ibid.*: 15). Beside those listed under intensity in table 2, one more statistic is given under duration. This is the exponential regression coefficient ($\exp(b_k)$), expressing hazard ratios, which is the relationship between two hazards. Negative hazard rates give hazard ratios ranging between zero and one, while positive hazard rates give hazard ratios larger than one. Hazard ratios are interpreted as relative changes in the risk (or hazard) of experiencing the event, in this case conflict termination, when the independent variable is increased by one unit of measure. Hazard ratios greater than one imply that the risk increases with the dependent variable, thus leading to shorter conflicts, whereas hazard ratios ranging between zero and one mean the risk decreases when the independent variable increases, leading to longer conflicts (*ibid.*: 63). For instance, $\exp(b_k)=1.20$ would predict a 20% increase in the risk when the covariate increases by one unit of measure, whereas $\exp(b_k)=0.80$ corresponds to a 20% decrease.

Results show that religious conflicts are predicted to have significantly lower risks of termination compared to non-religious ones when other impacts are unaccounted for. The hazard ratio of 0.501 indicates that the expected risk of termination in conflicts with a religious cleavage is approximately half of the expected

⁴¹ The exponential of the regression coefficient is $\exp(0.341) = 1.406$, predicting a 40.6% increase in battle-deaths when we turn from non-religious conflicts to religious ones. The constant, giving the predicted value of the dependent variable when the independent variable is zero, is 6.388. As the dependent variable is a logarithmic expression of battle-related deaths, an exponential transformation reveals the associated level of deaths in a conflict-year. For conflicts with no religious cleavage this gives 595 ($=\exp(6.388)$) and for conflicts with a cleavage 836 ($=\exp(6.388+0.341)$).

risk for conflicts with no religious cleavage during one year. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship. The dashed line gives the estimated cumulative hazard rate for conflicts without a religious cleavage, illustrating the probability for a conflict to terminate at a given duration time or earlier. It is evident that these conflicts experience higher cumulative hazards, thus shorter duration, than conflicts with a religious cleavage (solid line) throughout the entire duration. Hence, not regarding other factors, the results provide support for hypothesis 2.

Figure 2: Predicted cumulative hazard rates for religious and non-religious conflict



The coefficients for discrimination and legitimacy fail to reach significance. Hence, there is no support for hypotheses 4 and 6 in bivariate results. Fractionalization and polarization, on the other hand, are both significant and positive; highly fractionalized or polarized societies on average experience shorter conflicts than countries with low scores of fractionalization or polarization, respectively. Concerning fractionalization this may be taken as support for hypothesis 8a, while the opposite is true regarding polarization and hypothesis 8b. Still, bivariate results do not provide sufficient grounds to conclude decisively whether the hypotheses hold. In order to

examine how conflict dynamics really are affected by these factors, we turn to multivariate regressions.

5.2 Multivariate Results

To reach solid conclusions concerning how the covariates affect the intensity and duration of internal conflicts, it is necessary to control for other impacts. This section provides multivariate regressions and examines partial effects on the two dependent variables. In practice this reveals how intensity and duration vary when we change the value on one independent variable, keeping other factors constant. I will first assess the impacts on intensity, before I turn to the duration of intrastate conflicts.

5.2.1 Intensity

Results from the multivariate OLS regression on intensity are presented in table 3. They show that religious conflict-years are predicted to be significantly more intense than non-religious conflict-years, as the religious cleavage coefficient is positive and significant across different models. Model I-1 includes all variables except religious polarization (due to collinearity). Model I-2 replaces fractionalization by polarization. Models I-3 and I-4 are revised versions of the first two, excluding non-significant indicators. I will start by looking at models I-1 and I-2.

Before embarking on the analysis, the models' fit to data should be discussed. R^2 is an expression for explained variation. It informs us of how much of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by covariates included in the model. It ranges from zero to one, and higher values imply better fit. When the number of covariates is large and the number of observations small, this measure tends to be somewhat inflated. In this case the number of observations is large, but there are quite many independent variables in the model. Consequently, I also report the adjusted R^2 , which takes these factors into consideration (Skog 2004: 265-266). In models I-1 and I-2 adjusted R^2 equals 0.396 and 0.398, respectively; covariates explain approximately 40% of the variation in the dependent variable. Although more than half of the variation remains unexplained, these R^2 -scores are relatively high. Still, it indicates that the dependent variable and the lagged intensity variable do not correlate too

strongly. The remaining variation can be due to two things. First, important variables may be omitted. Second, idiographic properties of the conflicts make it impossible to explain all variation. Nevertheless, the purpose here is not to maximize R^2 . Rather, the aim is to assess whether or not religious cleavages are important for conflict intensity. With this in mind an adjusted R^2 close to 0.4 is very satisfactory.

In models I-1 and I-2 the cleavage indicator is positive and significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, with 95% confidence religious cleavages can be said to increase conflict intensity, *ceteris paribus*. Turning from non-religious conflict-years to religious ones in model I-1, the dependent variable (log battle-deaths) is expected to increase by 0.360 units of measure, corresponding to a 43.3% increase in the number of battle-related deaths in a given year.⁴² When all other variables are kept constant at zero, representing a conflict in a country with no state religion and mean values on other indicators, religious conflicts are expected to kill 288 more people than non-religious conflicts during one conflict-year. Model I-2, replacing fractionalization with polarization, confirms this relationship. In this model, turning from non-religious to religious conflict-years the dependent variable is predicted to increase by 0.306 units of measure, other things equal.⁴³ In one year this equals a 35.8% increase in the number of battle-related deaths. More specifically, a conflict in a country with no state religion and other indicators at mean values is expected to annually kill 249 more people if it includes a religious cleavage, compared to a similar conflict with no religious cleavage. These findings confirm bivariate results, suggesting that the apparent link between religion and conflict intensity is not simply a matter of oversimplification; controlling for other factors does not annul the relationship. In sum, hypothesis 1 is supported.

Religious discrimination proved highly significant in the bivariate analysis. Controlling for other factors this effect drops below the chosen level of significance. Neither is the cleavage-discrimination interaction term significant. Ergo, the direct effect is annulled. There are two possible explanations why the effect falls below significance in the multivariate analysis. First, collinearity or multicollinearity may

⁴² $\text{Exp}(0.360) = 1.433$.

⁴³ The coefficients from models I-1 and I-2 differ because their calculations are based on different values on fractionalization and polarization.

Table 3: Regression Analysis of Determinants of Conflict Intensity

	Model I-1	Model I-2	Model I-3	Model I-4
<i>Religious Cleavage</i>	0.360* (0.143)	0.306* (0.142)	0.397** (0.133)	0.330* (0.135)
<i>Religious Discrimination</i>	0.006 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)		
<i>Cleavage * Discrimination</i>	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)		
<i>Religious Legitimacy</i>	0.594** (0.195)	0.503** (0.184)	0.623*** (0.166)	0.468** (0.162)
<i>Cleavage * Legitimacy</i>	-0.748** (0.231)	-0.705** (0.221)	-0.809*** (0.204)	-0.733*** (0.202)
<i>Religious Fractionalization^a</i>	0.977* (0.404)		1.313*** (0.247)	
<i>Cleavage * Fractionalization</i>	0.271 (0.522)			
<i>Religious Polarization^a</i>		0.725** (0.253)		0.985*** (0.183)
<i>Cleavage * Polarization</i>		0.341 (0.381)		
<i>Regime Type</i>	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.034*** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)
<i>Regime Type (sq)</i>	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.007*** 0.002	-0.007*** (0.002)
<i>GDP per Capita (ln)^a</i>	-0.069 (0.049)	-0.078 (0.049)		
<i>Primary Comm. Exp./GDP (ln)^a</i>	0.080 (0.052)	0.096 (0.051)		
<i>Population Size (ln)^a</i>	-0.033 (0.040)	-0.018 (0.040)		
<i>Lagged Battle Deaths (ln)</i>	0.293*** (0.016)	0.292*** (0.016)	0.292*** (0.016)	0.291*** (0.016)
<i>Number of Conflicts (ln)</i>	0.557*** (0.128)	0.540*** (0.128)	0.503*** (0.113)	0.472*** (0.112)
<i>Missing on Discrimination</i>	0.617 (0.421)	0.406 (0.427)		
<i>Missing on Regime Type</i>	0.432* (0.174)	0.472** (0.172)	0.403* (0.164)	0.443** (0.165)
<i>Missing on GDP per Capita</i>	0.453* (0.207)	0.450* (0.207)		
<i>Missing on Prim.Comm.Exp./GDP</i>	0.065 (0.613)	0.470 (0.610)		
<i>Missing on Population Size</i>	0.453* (0.207)	0.450* (0.207)		
<i>Constant</i>	6.497*** (0.141)	6.544*** (0.140)	6.563*** (0.132)	6.644*** (0.132)
<i>R²</i>	0.407	0.408	0.397	0.397
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.396	0.398	0.392	0.392
<i>N</i>	1035	1035	1035	1035

Note: Reported statistics are unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.
^a A squared term has been tested, but is omitted here as it did not yield significant results.
* p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

raise the standard deviation (Skog 2004: 286-288). The standard deviation does increase when controlling for other factors, from 0.005 in the bivariate analysis to 0.009 in both models I-1 and I-2. Correlations with other variables are acceptable, and, hence, collinearity is not considered to be a problem. However, as mentioned above (see section 4.2.2) the discrimination variable has a low tolerance value ($<.17$), indicating multicollinearity. Excluding the interaction term, the tolerance value is considerably higher ($>.60$) and the standard deviation is nearly halved. Still, the discrimination indicator is still far from the chosen level of significance.⁴⁴ Second, the control for mediating and confounding factors may ‘reduce the magnitude of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables’ (MacKinnon *et al.* 2000: 174). Whereas the parameter estimate is 0.020 in the bivariate analysis, it is 0.006 and 0.003 in models I-1 and I-2, respectively. Mediation and confounding are likely explanations and the reduced significance can be attributed to the fact that the controlled effect is qualitatively different from the bivariate one. Consequently, religious discrimination does not contribute to the prediction of intensity levels in intrastate conflicts, and hypothesis 3 is not supported.


Whereas religious discrimination proved significant in the bivariate analysis and non-significant in the multivariate one, the opposite is the case for religious legitimacy. This indicator fell just short of the 5% level in the bivariate analysis. When other variables are taken into account religious legitimacy turns significant at the 1% level in both models I-1 and I-2. The same is true for the cleavage-legitimacy interaction term. The increased level of significance compared to the bivariate regression is due to an increase in the parameter estimate. This indicates the presence of suppression (*ibid.*). A surprising result is that the interaction term is negative and larger than the legitimacy indicator’s positive coefficient. Figure 3, based on model I-1, illustrates the interaction between religious cleavages and religious legitimacy.⁴⁵ The two leftmost columns illustrate the estimated effect of legitimacy in non-religious conflicts, and the two rightmost columns portray the same for religious conflicts. For each conflict type the leftmost column represents countries with low religious legitimacy and the rightmost

⁴⁴ $p=0.624$ including fractionalization and $p=0.463$ including polarization.

⁴⁵ The relationship is similar for other models.

column portrays countries with high religious legitimacy. A 95% confidence interval is calculated for the effect of legitimacy. For units with low legitimacy, the top of the bar represents the estimated intensity level when other factors are kept constant at zero. Concerning countries with high legitimacy, the top of the full-coloured areas are predicted annual battle-deaths, whereas the range from the bottom of the full-coloured area to the top of the shaded area represents the confidence interval. With 95% confidence, the true value is in this range, other factors kept constant at zero.

Figure 3: Estimated interaction between religious cleavages and religious legitimacy in the effect on conflict intensity



Note: Based on model I-1. 95% confidence intervals calculated for the legitimacy indicator and the cleavage-legitimacy interaction term. Other factors kept constant at zero.

The figure shows that, other things equal, conflict-years with no religious cleavage are on average more violent in countries with a state religion than those without one. This is evident as the lower boundary of the confidence interval for countries with high legitimacy are above the estimated intensity level for countries with low legitimacy. In model I-1, turning from zero to one on the legitimacy indicator more specifically predicts 81.1% more battle-deaths in a non-religious conflict, other things equal. Similarly, a 65.4% increase is predicted when turning from low to high legitimacy in model I-2, *ceteris paribus*.

Among religious conflicts, the presence of a state religion in fact predicts *less* intense conflicts compared to countries with no state religion. When all other variables stay constant at zero, a religious conflict in a country with a state religion on average kills 136, or 14.3%, fewer people annually. Results from model I-2 are similar, predicting an 18.3% decrease. It should be noted, however, that although both the legitimacy indicator and the interaction term are significant, the effect of religious legitimacy in religious conflicts is not. This is portrayed in figure 3 where the 95% confidence interval for countries with high legitimacy overlaps the estimate for countries with low legitimacy, meaning that there is no significant difference at the 5% level. A similar result is found for model I-2. In sum, results do not provide support for hypothesis 5.

Both indicators of religious demography returned positive and significant coefficients in the bivariate analyses. This is also the case in the multivariate regression. Their interaction terms, however, are non-significant, signifying that religious demography impacts similarly on religious and non-religious conflict. Religious fractionalization yields a positive coefficient significant at the 5% level. Societies that are highly fractionalized with respect to religion are predicted to experience more bloody conflicts than less fractionalized ones. This is true for both non-religious and religious conflicts. The parameter estimate of 0.977 corresponds to a 21.6% increase in the annual number of battle-related deaths when fractionalization increases by one standard deviation in a non-religious conflict, *ceteris paribus*.⁴⁶ In a conflict-year where all other indicators have the value zero this amounts to 143 lives. For religious conflicts, the interaction term must be taken into consideration. Increasing fractionalization by one standard deviation, other things equal, predicts an increase of 28.4% in intensity, equalling 188 battle-related deaths when all other factors are constant at zero. Hence, hypothesis 7a is not supported. Religious fractionalization tends to aggravate rather than tranquilize religious conflicts.


Polarization also leads to higher levels of intensity in both religious and non-religious conflict. In non-religious conflicts, when increasing polarization by one standard deviation, other things equal, annual killings are predicted to increase by

⁴⁶ With a standard deviation of 0.20: $\exp(0.977*0.20) = 1.216$.

20.7%, equalling 144 battle-deaths when all other factors are constant at zero. Similarly, an increase in polarization by one standard deviation in religious conflicts predicts a 31.9% increase in annual battle-deaths. Keeping other factors constant at zero this constitutes 222 lives. Hence, the results are in support of hypothesis 7b.

Among control variables, indicators measuring level of development, resource wealth, and population size are all non-significant. The regime type coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.1% level. However, the significant quadric term reveals a non-linear effect; when increasing regime type by one unit of measure, the change in the dependent variable is contingent on the original regime type value.

Figure 4: Predicted effect of regime type on conflict intensity



Note: Based on model I-1. Other factors kept constant at zero.

Figure 4, portraying this relationship for model I-1, shows that this relationship is not only non-linear; it is non-monotonic as well. The solid line represents conflict-years with a religious cleavage, while the dashed line represents non-religious conflict-years. The former stays consistently 43.3% higher when all other factors are kept at zero. The figure demonstrates that the highest intensity levels are expected to occur in

slightly authoritarian regimes (Polity score of -2.75),⁴⁷ whereas fully authoritarian regimes on average experience higher intensity levels than fully democratic ones. This is interesting and suggests that the impact from regime type on conflict intensity is similar to the effect found on conflict onset, where intermediary regimes face higher risks than autocracies, which again face higher risks than democracies (Hegre *et al.* 2001). Comparing fully authoritarian states with fully democratic ones, thus moving 20 points up the scale, conflict-years are predicted to be 52.5% less intense in democracies, *ceteris paribus*.

Not surprisingly, the lagged battle-deaths variable, measuring the preceding year's intensity level, is positive and highly significant. This finding suggests that conflict history affects conflict intensity; a bloody preceding year predicts a new bloody year, other things equal. Also the number of simultaneously ongoing conflicts is a strong predictor of intensity levels. This is not surprising, inasmuch as a country experiencing multiple conflicts should see more battles and consequently more battle-related deaths.

The final variables in the analysis are dummies measuring whether or not missing values have been replaced by mean scores for certain indicators. The results show that three of these are significant, while two are far from reaching significance. The two non-significant indicators signify that missing values on the corresponding variables are not systematically linked to conflict intensity. The three significant coefficients are all positive, indicating that conflict-years with missing values on regime type, level of development, and population size are predicted to be more intense than others. Omitting units with missing values might have led to misleading results, as those omitted would be among the more intense conflict-years. As mentioned above, it is commonly found that the most conflict-ridden countries are those in which data collection is hardest. Thus, positive coefficients are not surprising.

In models I-1 and I-2 there are several non-significant variables. These display non-structured variation and can favourably be removed. In models I-3 and I-4 these are filtered out in order to better examine variables which have proven significant. The

⁴⁷ The vertex of a concave graph is found by $X^* = (-b_1)/2b_2$, where b_1 represents the first-degree and b_2 the second-degree coefficient (Skog 2004: 285). This gives -2.750 in model I-1, -2.833 in model I-2, -2.714 in model I-3, and -2.786 in model I-4.

removal of non-significant variables does not substantially harm the model's fit to data. The adjusted R^2 is 0.392 for both models I-3 and I-4. Hence, the models each explain 39.2% of the variation in intensity. This is highly satisfactory.

These models confirm the findings from the first two models. All included variables remain significant with similar parameter estimates. The main explanatory variable have lower p -scores in both models compared to models I-1 and I-2, and in model I-3 it reaches significance at the 1% level. Including fractionalization and excluding polarization, the parameter estimate of 0.397 signifies that annual battle-deaths are predicted to increase by 48.7% when we turn from non-religious to religious conflicts, *ceteris paribus*. When all other variables stay constant at zero, representing a conflict-year in a country with no state religion and mean scores on other variables, this equals 346 lives. In model I-4 a coefficient of 0.330 corresponds to a predicted increase of 39.1% – or 300 deaths – when we turn from non-religious to religious conflicts with other variables at zero. These impacts are even stronger than those in models I-1 and I-2. Hence, the main hypothesis regarding intensity is further strengthened.

Religious legitimacy performs in a manner similar to the first two models. The interaction term is negative and highly significant. Having a larger absolute value than the positive legitimacy indicator, this indicates that religious conflicts on average have lower intensity levels when a state religion is present, *ceteris paribus*. While turning from low to high legitimacy in non-religious conflicts predicts an 86.4% increase in intensity levels, the number of battle-related deaths is expected to decrease 17% in religious conflicts, other things equal (model I-3). A similar result is found for model I-4; turning from low to high legitimacy scores predicts a 59.7% increase in battle-deaths in non-religious conflict and a 23.3% decrease in religious conflict. As in the first two models, the effect of legitimacy is non-significant when looking at religious conflicts separately. In sum, this corresponds well with what was found in models I-1 and I-2 and does not provide support for hypothesis 5.

Religious fractionalization and polarization are both significant at the 0.1% level. Regarding fractionalization, the coefficient of 1.313 predicts a 29.3% increase in the number of battle-deaths when fractionalization increases by one standard deviation,

other things equal. Increasing polarization by one standard deviation, predicts 29.2% more battle-related deaths, *ceteris paribus*. Since the non-significant interaction terms are left out at this point, these numbers apply to both religious and non-religious conflicts. As for models I-1 and I-2 this is in support of hypothesis 7b, whereas there is no support for hypothesis 7a. Included control variables also perform similarly to the first two models.

We have seen that religious cleavages tend to intensify intrastate conflicts, as expected. The expectations concerning religious polarization have been met as well. On the other hand, the indicators measuring religious discrimination, legitimacy, and fractionalization perform differently than hypothesized. In sum, it is evident that the apparent link between faith and conflict intensity is not merely a matter of oversimplification; religion does influence the intensity of internal conflicts. Now it is time to look at how these factors affect conflict duration. Controlling for other factors, are religious conflicts significantly longer than other conflicts?

5.2.2 Duration

Table 4 presents the results from the survival analysis of conflict duration. Model D-1 includes all variables except religious polarization, while polarization replaces fractionalization in model D-2. Model D-3 includes indicators that proved significant in the first two models only. How well do the models fit data? This is answered by the information at the bottom of table 4. The log likelihood ratio (LR) compares log likelihood (-2LL) values for the model stipulated by the null hypothesis and the applied model (Skog 2004: 375). If there is no relationship between the covariates and the dependent variable, the probability distribution for LR will resemble the chi square distribution corresponding to the relevant degrees of freedom (df) (*ibid.*). The significance scores inform us on how much LR differs from what is expected from such a distribution. For all models the level of significance is <0.1%. Hence, the models differ significantly from what is expected if there is no statistical relationship. In sum, the global fit to data is considered highly satisfactory.

Table 4: Survival Analysis of Determinants of Conflict Duration

	Model D-1		Model D-2		Model D-3	
	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>exp(b)</i>	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>exp(b)</i>	<i>b</i> (SE)	<i>exp(b)</i>
<i>Religious Cleavage</i>	6.394*** (0.500)	598.499	6.272*** (0.501)	529.550	6.314*** (0.495)	552.506
<i>Cleavage * Time (ln)</i>	-0.927*** (0.062)	0.396	-0.928*** (0.062)	0.395	-0.931*** (0.062)	0.394
<i>Religious Discrimination</i>	-0.026** (0.008)	0.974	-0.038*** (0.009)	0.963	-0.036*** (0.009)	0.965
<i>Cleavage * Discrimination</i>	0.028* (0.012)	1.028	0.036** (0.012)	1.037	0.030** (0.012)	1.031
<i>Religious Legitimacy</i>	5.936*** (0.556)	378.331	6.053*** (0.561)	425.183	5.993*** (0.563)	400.632
<i>Cleavage * Legitimacy</i>	-1.610*** (0.403)	0.200	-1.771*** (0.412)	0.170	-1.583*** (0.395)	0.205
<i>Legitimacy * Time (ln)</i>	-0.777*** (0.070)	0.460	-0.788*** (0.071)	0.455	-0.782*** (0.071)	0.458
<i>Religious Fractionalization^a</i>	0.276 (0.525)	1.318				
<i>Cleavage * Fractionalization</i>	1.105 (0.821)	3.020				
<i>Religious Polarization</i>			0.009 (0.462)	1.010	0.379 (0.335)	1.461
<i>Religious Polarization (sq)</i>			-4.135** (1.479)	0.016	-3.070* (1.255)	0.046
<i>Cleavage * Polarization</i>			0.822 (0.798)	2.276		
<i>Regime Type^a</i>	-0.022 (0.014)	0.978	-0.033* (0.014)	0.968	-0.034* (0.014)	0.967
<i>GDP per Capita^a</i>	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.000	-0.000** (0.000)	1.000	-0.000** (0.000)	1.000
<i>GDP per Cap. * Time (ln)</i>	0.000*** (0.000)	1.000	0.000*** (0.000)	1.000	0.000*** (0.000)	1.000
<i>Prim. Comm. Exp./GDP</i>	-0.620 (0.997)	0.538	0.463 (1.041)	1.589	0.242 (1.035)	1.273
<i>Prim. C. Exp./GDP(sq)</i>	6.824** (2.143)	919.887	5.028* (2.206)	152.633	4.983* (2.206)	145.880
<i>Missing on Discrimination</i>	1.453* (0.662)	4.275	1.830** (0.698)	6.233	1.042 (0.539)	2.836
<i>Missing on Regime Type</i>	-0.632** (0.245)	0.531	-0.592* (0.245)	0.553	-0.587* (0.244)	0.556
<i>Missing on GDP per Cap.</i>	0.538* (0.229)	1.713	0.556* (0.232)	1.761	0.573* (0.232)	1.773
<i>Missing on P.C.Exp./GDP</i>	-1.624 (1.200)	0.197	-1.743 (1.210)	0.175		
<i>LR</i>	-458.808		-466.309		-462.847	
<i>df</i>	18		19		17	
<i>Sig.</i>	0.000		0.000		0.000	
<i>N</i>	1528		1528		1528	


Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.

^a A squared term has been tested, but is omitted here as it did not yield significant results.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

How do individual variables perform? Keep in mind that positive hazard rates (b_k) give hazard ratios ($\exp(b_k)$) larger than one and imply shorter duration while negative hazard rates correspond to hazard ratios between zero and one and longer duration. Hazard rates for the religious cleavage indicator are positive and significant at the 0.1% level in all models. Hazard ratios indicate that the predicted hazard for termination of religious conflicts is manifold that of non-religious conflicts. However, this statistic relates to a situation where duration time is zero, which is not substantially meaningful. In order to get a grasp of how religious cleavages really affect duration, the interaction term with duration time must be considered. This coefficient is also significant at the 0.1% level in all models. Its negative sign informs us that the hazard rate for religious cleavages decreases with time.

Figure 5: Predicted hazard rates for religious cleavages at different duration times



Note: Based on model D-3. Other factors kept constant at zero.

Figure 5, based on model D-3, illustrates this relationship, revealing an ambiguous impact from religious cleavages. An interesting fact is that turning from religious to non-religious conflict predicts an increase in the risk of termination in the early phases of conflict, whereas it predicts reduced risk in later phases. Bivariate

results conceal this ambiguity. According to the latter religious conflicts should have approximately half the risk of termination during one conflict-year. Multivariate regressions show that, on average, it takes about five years of conflict before this is true when controlling for other factors.⁴⁸ Calculations further show that the hazard rate turns negative, implying that religious conflicts are predicted to be less likely to be terminated than other conflicts, after approximately two and a half years when other factors are kept constant at zero.⁴⁹

Effects are most easily interpreted as hazard ratios. Table 5 shows the development of hazard ratios over time when other factors are kept constant at zero. Disregarding polarization, turning from non-religious to religious conflicts predicts an increase in the risk of termination by a factor of 236.961 at the first day of conflict when other indicators are kept constant at zero. After one year of conflict the hazard ratio is down to 2.529, predicting that religious conflicts face a risk 152.9% higher than conflicts without a religious cleavage. As mentioned above, the hazard rate reaches zero, equalling a hazard ratio of one, after approximately two and a half years. From this point religious conflicts' risk of termination is expected to be lower than that of non-religious conflicts. Having lasted five, ten and thirty years religious conflicts are predicted to have approximately 43%, 70%, and 89% lower risk of termination, *ceteris paribus*. Replacing fractionalization by polarization gives similar results. In model D-2 turning from non-religious to religious conflicts predicts the risk of termination to be raised by a factor of 209.342 after one day. After one year the expected risk is 121.8% higher for religious conflicts, while five, ten, and thirty years of conflict predict approximately 50%, 74%, and 91% lower risk of termination when other factors are kept constant. Model D-3, disregarding non-structured variation, gives similar results. In sum, results support hypothesis 2, but first when approximately two and a half years of conflict have passed.

⁴⁸ 2,100 days in model D-1, 1,817 in model D-2, and 1,858 in model D-3.

⁴⁹ In model D-1 the effect turns negative after 994 days, in model D-2 after 861 days, and in model D-3 after 882 days. This is found from $h(t) = b_1X_1 + b_2X_1X_2$, where X_1 is religious cleavage and X_2 is log duration time. Inserting known values for model D-1 gives $0 = 6.394*1 - 0.927*1*X_2 \Rightarrow 0.927X_2 = 6.394 \Rightarrow X_2 = 6.901$. As X_2 represents log duration time, both sides are transformed exponentially giving $\exp(X_2) = 994$.

Table 5: Predicted hazard ratios for religious cleavages at selected duration times

	Model D-1	Model D-2	Model D-3
<i>1 day</i>	236.961	209.342	217.781
<i>1 year</i>	2.529	2.218	2.275
<i>5 years</i>	0.569	0.498	0.508
<i>10 years</i>	0.300	0.262	0.267
<i>30 years</i>	0.108	0.094	0.096


In the bivariate analysis, religious discrimination proved non-significant. Controlling for other impacts it turns significant as a suppression effect increases the regression coefficient. The indicator has a negative hazard rate, signifying that an increase in the discrimination score tends to lower the risk of termination, thus predicting longer duration, other things equal. In a conflict without a religious cleavage the hazard ratios tell us that a one point increase in discrimination reduces the expected risk of termination by approximately 3%. As the interaction term is significant as well, discrimination affects religious conflicts differently. Having a coefficient close to that of the discrimination indicator, this more or less annuls the effect of discrimination in religious conflicts in models D-1 and D-2. This is surprising, as religious discrimination predicts longer duration in non-religious conflicts, but not in religious conflicts. In model D-3, disregarding non-structured variation, results are somewhat different. Here the hazard rate for discrimination is -0.036 while the interaction term's hazard rate is 0.030. This corresponds to a 0.6% reduction in the hazard rate, thus predicting longer conflicts, when discrimination is raised one point in a religious conflict, other things equal.⁵⁰ Raising discrimination by one standard deviation, other factors kept constant, predicts a 7.9% reduction in hazard rates. Turning from the lowest to the highest discrimination score in the dataset, the risk of termination for a religious conflict is expected to be reduced by 27.5%, *ceteris paribus*. Results from model D-3 support hypothesis 4; religious discrimination tends to prolong religious conflict.

Similar to discrimination, religious legitimacy also turns significant when controlling for other impacts, due to a suppression effect. Both interaction terms, with cleavage and time, are significant as well. Predicted hazard rates for non-religious and

⁵⁰ $\text{Exp}(0.030 - 0.036) = 0.994$.

religious conflicts across time are presented in figure 6, based on model D-3. This shows that hazard rates decrease as duration time increases. Furthermore, the graph representing religious conflicts stay consistently 1.583 points lower, due to cleavage-legitimacy interaction.

Figure 6: Predicted hazard rates for religious legitimacy at different duration times



Note: Based on model D-3. Other factors kept constant at zero.

Table 6, based on model D-3, exhibits hazard ratios for non-religious and religious conflicts at different duration times. Results show that, other factors kept constant, the presence of a state religion is expected to raise prospects for termination in the first phases of conflict and lower them in later phases. In non-religious conflict an increase in religious legitimacy predicts higher risks of termination for more than five years, whereas this effect tends to diminish quickly in religious conflict. In the latter case religious legitimacy is predicted to accommodate termination for 234 days and prolong conflict from this point forward. Hence, in protracted conflicts religious legitimacy is expected to hinder conflict termination. In sum, hypothesis 6 is supported, although this effect arises first when 234 days have passed.


Table 6: Predicted hazard ratios for religious legitimacy at selected duration times

	Non-religious conflict	Religious conflict
<i>1 day</i>	400.632	82.223
<i>1 year</i>	3.367	0.725
<i>5 years</i>	1.050	0.226
<i>10 years</i>	0.635	0.137
<i>30 years</i>	0.287	0.062

The two demographic variables both proved positive and significant in the bivariate analyses, indicating that higher scores on fractionalization or polarization predict shorter conflicts. Controlling for other factors, fractionalization, although keeping a positive hazard rate, turns non-significant. As the regression coefficient is substantially reduced, the reason is presumably mediation or confounding effects. In either case the direct effect is no longer statistically significant. Religious fractionalization does not affect duration more than what we can expect from statistical contingency, and hypothesis 8a is not supported.

Religious polarization and its interaction term return non-significant coefficients as well, but its squared term is significant at the 1% level in model D-2. Removing non-structured variation, the first-degree coefficient increases from 0.009 to 0.379 while the second-degree coefficient changes from -4.135 to -3.070 in model D-3. Moreover, the squared term falls short of the 1% level of significance, but remains significant at the 5% level. Interpreting its impact, both the first- and the second-degree indicator should be taken into account. The negative squared term informs us of a concave trend. Figure 7 illustrates how hazard rates vary with different levels of religious polarization.⁵¹ Except for a short range of polarization scores just above the mean, hazard rates are negative. Hence, increasing the degree of polarization tends to predict prolonged conflict, *ceteris paribus*. This supports hypothesis 8b.

⁵¹ This indicator is centred around its mean. Zero in the figure corresponds to a score of 0.52 on the fractionalization index.

Figure 7: Predicted hazard rates for religious polarization (centred)

Among the control variables regime type is non-significant in model D-1, indicating no effect from this variable on duration when polarization is disregarded. In model D-2 it obtains significance at the 5% level. The same is the case in model D-3. Hazard ratios demonstrate that a one-point increase on the regime type indicator reduces the expected risk of termination by 3.3%, thus giving longer conflicts. GDP per capita is marginally negative with a marginally positive interaction with time. The effect is imperceptible. Although it is highly significant, it is not substantially meaningful. The first-degree resource wealth indicator is non-significant in all models. Its squared term, however, returns positive and significant, and consequently resource wealth cannot be discounted as irrelevant. The positive signs in model D-3 reveal a convex trend where an increase in resource wealth predicts shorter conflicts, other things equal, when non-significant variables are left out.

Among the indicators measuring the prevalence of missing values those relating to discrimination, regime type, and level of development all return significant coefficients in models D-1 and D-2, whereas the one concerning resource wealth is non-significant. In model 3 the missing-indicator for discrimination fails to reach significance. A positive hazard rate for the indicator pertaining to level of development indicates that units who have missing values on this indicator are expected to

experience shorter conflicts than others. A negative coefficient for regime type's missing indicator informs us that units with missing values on regime type on average experience longer conflicts. Omitting units with missing values on these indicators might have led to misleading results.

5.3 Discussion and Summary of Main Results

The seeming relationship between faith and conflict dynamics is not merely an oversimplification. Multivariate results indicate that the intensity and duration of internal conflicts are influenced by religion. Table 7 sums up the findings. Two out of five hypotheses concerning intensity and four out of five pertaining to duration are supported; six out of ten in total. Making inferences from the findings, the most likely explanations should be identified. In general two sorts of explanations can account for findings. First, substantial explanations are based on properties of the object of investigation. Second, methodological explanations are grounded on properties of the investigation itself (Hellevik 2002: 353-354). Possible methodological explanations are selection bias, spurious relationships, non-fulfilled methodological assumptions, and low validity or reliability. Does this study suffer from any of these problems? As mentioned (section 4.2.1) there is a slight selection bias in this study, as only conflicts which reach 25 annual battle-deaths are included. Nevertheless, better data does not exist. Besides, removing this threshold would harm reliability and could lead to a different sort of selection bias as conflicts in certain countries might be underreported. Furthermore, given the availability of conflict data, this study includes all observations in the relevant period where necessary data collection has proved possible within the given temporal limitations. Selection bias may also relate to the included variables. Violations of this criterion may be hard to identify, but several control variables have been included in order to minimize this problem. Although no variables have been deliberately omitted, it would be preferable to control for duration in the intensity analysis and vice versa. However, due to the different structures of the two datasets (intensity data are aggregates of simultaneous conflicts) reliability requirements would not be met. Assumptions stemming from applied methods are considered adequately satisfied. This is also suggested by the models' fit to data. When it comes to data's

validity, religious legitimacy might be problematic. This variable's operational definition does not capture all aspects of the concept, but is preferred due to high reliability. On the other hand, reliability may be problematic in relation to the dependent variables, especially intensity, as this is based on a best estimate. Still, this is unlikely to cause systematic errors of measurement. Therefore, the following discussion mainly focuses on substantial interpretations.

The main explanatory variable, measuring the presence of identity-based religious cleavages, contributes significantly to the explanation of both aspects of conflict dynamics, predicting more violent and longer-lasting conflicts where belligerents adhere to different religious traditions, although its impact on duration is somewhat ambiguous. Regarding intensity results may be taken as an indication that identity-based religious cleavages do in fact ease intragroup problems. The higher intensity levels among conflicts across religious identities may be due to conflicting belief-systems, perceptions of 'us' and 'them', arenas of mobilization and religious trust, making it easier to overcome intragroup problems.⁵² Results are in line with the findings of Fox (2004b, 2004c), Pearce (2005), Roeder (2003), and Tuscisny (2004).

In support of Fox (2004b), Regan (2002), and Svensson (2007a) religious conflicts are found to be longer-lasting on average. However, religious cleavages tend to increase the risk of termination in the first phases of conflict and predict prolonged conflict only when approximately two and a half years have passed. This deserves attention. What can explain the ambiguous effect of religious cleavages on duration? One possible explanation for the initial effect of high risk of termination is that in religious conflicts potential negotiators are more easily identified. When adherents of two different faiths fight, it is natural to call upon peaceful religious leadership. This will arguably not be equally commonplace when belligerents split along political or regional identities or when both groups are without a distinct religious identity. Among religious leaders there are necessarily some advocates of peace. Whereas these may have a large audience in early phases, their message may be drowned by others as belligerents are demonized, as the enemy utilizes faith instrumentally, and as

⁵² It should be noted that these analyses is merely suited to examine the direction and strength of the impact. The exact mechanisms at work cannot be accounted for here.

perceptions of ‘the others’ grow. And whereas religious leaders may be invited to peace-talks in early phases, they may not be trusted in later phases. When faith is used in the mobilization process it may gradually lose its peace-building capacity as adversaries become even less trustworthy.

Another possible explanation is that religious conflicts more easily are terminated quickly not due to religious leaders and their role as peace-builders, but because one party is able to quickly defeat the other. According to Licklider (1995: 688-689) 16 out of 23 identity conflicts that were terminated within the first three years ended through victory. However, studies that differentiate religious conflicts from others predict that religious ones more often end by settlement and fewer by rebel victory than other conflicts, *ceteris paribus* (DeRouen & Sobek 2004; Walter 1997: 358).

Table 7: Hypotheses and support

Hypotheses		Support?
<i>H1</i>	Religious conflicts are more intense than non-religious conflicts, <i>ceteris paribus</i>	Yes
<i>H2</i>	Religious conflicts last longer than non-religious conflicts, <i>ceteris paribus</i>	Yes
<i>H3</i>	In conflicts with a religious cleavage, higher religious discrimination leads to more intense conflicts, <i>ceteris paribus</i>	No
<i>H4</i>	In conflicts with a religious cleavage, higher religious discrimination leads to longer conflicts, <i>ceteris paribus</i>	Yes
<i>H5</i>	In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious legitimacy leads to more intense conflicts, <i>ceteris paribus</i>	No
<i>H6</i>	In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious legitimacy leads to longer conflicts, <i>ceteris paribus</i>	Yes
<i>H7a</i>	In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious fractionalization reduces intensity levels, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .	No
<i>H7b</i>	In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious polarization increases intensity levels, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .	Yes
<i>H8a</i>	In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious fractionalization leads to shorter conflicts, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .	No
<i>H8b</i>	In conflicts with a religious cleavage, religious polarization leads to longer conflicts, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .	Yes

The fact that religious cleavages predict higher levels of intensity and tend to reduce prospects for termination of intractable conflict makes religious conflicts especially severe. Protracted, violent conflicts are particularly harmful. Survivors need to cope with memories of bloodshed, the loss of family members and friends, a misguided economy, poor public services, and perhaps the threat of recurring civil war. The possibility that high intensity levels contribute to longer duration and vice versa should not be ruled out. Although the performed analyses have not been able to control for this, a mutual reinforcing effect between these aspects of conflict dynamics may contribute to the severity of religious conflicts.

Turning to the other variables, religious discrimination did not return significant results in the intensity analysis. One explanation is that it simply is unimportant for this aspect of conflict dynamics. Alternatively, it may be that discrimination invigorates rebels but this effect is cancelled out as discrimination deprives them of resources needed for mobilization or as some potential rebels opt out as they fear punishment, something that is more likely with a discriminating regime. Thus, if discrimination in fact does give hateful feelings, these may be countered by feelings of fear. Concerning duration an interesting finding is that religious discrimination tends to have a stronger impact on non-religious conflict than religious conflict. Although this is unexpected, the effect on non-religious conflict is not surprising *per se* inasmuch as religious discrimination is likely to correlate strongly with other forms of discrimination.

Religious legitimacy was expected to increase intensity in religious conflicts. However, it has no significant effect in conflicts with a religious cleavage, whereas it tends to intensify non-religious conflicts. Why is this so? An explanation needs to consider methodological properties. The operational definition of the concept is confined to the presence of a state religion. As discussed above (section 4.3.5) this is merely one among several aspects of the concept. An indicator capable of capturing these other aspects might have returned a different result. Still, the calming effect can be interpreted substantially as well, as religious legitimacy may suppress other sorts, for instance military legitimacy. Furthermore, the parameter estimate may conceal an interaction with duration time. Although it has not been possible to examine here,

religious legitimacy may have a calming effect in the first phases of conflict and an aggravating effect in later phases. The effect of legitimacy on the duration of religious conflicts proved, similar to the cleavage indicator, to interact with duration time. An increase in religious legitimacy predicts an increase in the risk of termination in the beginning of conflict and decreasing risk of termination in more entrenched conflicts, *ceteris paribus*. Looking at religious conflicts, turning from units with low religious legitimacy to units with high legitimacy the hazard of termination is estimated to increase if the conflict is in the first 234 days and decrease when 234 days have passed. The reason for this may be found in the first explanation proposed for the effect of religious cleavages. During initial phases religious elites take an active part as accommodators of peace. When a conflict is consolidated this opportunity may be lost as faith is instrumentalized, recruits are convinced to fight for their god(s), and belligerents are demonized. When these mechanisms are solidified intergroup trust will be ever harder to establish.

Both indicators of religious demography contribute significantly to the prediction of conflict intensity. Polarization performs as expected, indicating that in religiously polarized societies intragroup problems are easier overcome. This may be due to high intragroup trust and perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Fractionalization performs similarly, contrary to expectations. Why is this? One explanation may be that in fractionalized societies, friends and foes are harder to identify. As cultural distance increases the ‘others’ may all blur into a mass of potential enemies. Another substantial explanation is that a small community may develop a particularly strong sense of kinship. A methodological explanation is that the fractionalization index to a large degree captures polarization. After all, high degrees of fractionalization are uncommon and the two indices correlate strongly. Concerning duration fractionalization does not give significant results. Higher degrees of polarization predict longer duration, indicating that intergroup trust is low in religiously polarized societies. Effects from demography are not significantly different in religious conflicts compared to non-religious ones. This may be because religious fractionalization and polarization are valid proxies for other sorts of fractionalization and polarization.

6 CONCLUSION

Civil wars are costly. They cause people to be killed, injured, and maimed. They lead to vast numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. They divert assets from productive activities to destructive operations, and reduced public spending result in downgraded health care and education systems. This is especially troublesome as civilians suffer the most. In the 1990s nearly 90 percent of casualties of war were civilians (Collier *et al.* 2003: 17). As armed conflict becomes more intense and protracted it arguably gives higher costs. Given the vast physical and social costs of war, it is of interest to find out which factors influence on conflict dynamics in order to obtain knowledge that can help tranquilize and shorten conflicts.

This thesis has focused on the religion-conflict nexus. Religion is understood in collective and functional terms and the applied definition is based on five properties: it is a basis for identity; it includes a belief-system influencing individual behaviour; it includes doctrine or theology also influencing behaviour; it is a source of legitimacy; and it is associated with institutions. These five characteristics may all be important in armed conflict. Faith has proven important in various conflicts around the world and the relationship has been statistically confirmed in this thesis. The intensity analysis shows that the impact of religious cleavages is positive and significant across different model specifications. Disregarding non-significant variables, the introduction of religious cleavages predict a 48.7% increase in the number of annual battle-related deaths when religious polarization is left out and a 39.1% increase when polarization replaces fractionalization, *ceteris paribus*.

The link between religion and conflict intensity may be conceptualized through the introduction of intragroup problems. Collective action, coordination, and time-consistency represent three different intragroup problems. The collective action problem arises when individual cost-benefit assessments impede mobilization as prospective fighters realize the fight is over a public good. Theoretically, religion may help rebels overcome this problem through social capital and through alternative considerations of costs and benefits. For instance, the status of holy warrior and afterlife benefits related to martyrdom are unique to religious conflicts and of high value. Moreover, to refrain from fighting may imply certain social and emotional costs

if it is considered a break with doctrine. Coordination problems occur where people are reluctant to join a small group and at the same time unaware of each other's preferences. Although many are willing to join a large group there is no large group to join. Religious institutions combined with the legitimacy ascribed to clergymen offer a solution as religious leaders may function as coordinators. Problems of time-consistency appear when prospective soldiers suspect that their leaders, if they get in position to fulfil them, will break their promises. However, religious leaders are generally highly trusted and this problem should be reduced if religious authority is linked to the promises.

Religious cleavages also tend to affect the duration of internal conflict. This effect, however, varies with duration time. Holding other factors constant, religious conflict is more likely than other conflicts to be terminated during the first two and a half years. After the first year of conflict, religious conflicts are more than twice as likely as other conflicts to be terminated given that they have survived to that point and other factors are held constant. This effect changes with time, and when two and a half years have passed the opposite is the case; religious cleavages tend to prolong protracted conflict. After five years of conflict, given that they have survived to that point and other things are kept constant, the hazard of termination for religious conflicts is nearly half the hazard for non-religious conflicts. Theoretically, this may be due to intergroup problems. If neither party is able to win decisively, negotiations are needed to end the violence, and in order to establish dialogue the groups must first establish trust in each other's peaceful intentions and hope for a peaceable future. The credible commitment problem arises when at least one group is unwilling to settle because they expect their adversary to renege on stated promises. When the parties split along religious lines this lack of trust may more easily arise. Social capital rarely spans across religious divides, and when faith is instrumentalized in the mobilization process intergroup trust becomes even harder to establish.

In addition to the effects of religious cleavages other aspects of religion influence conflict dynamics. Results show that religious legitimacy, fractionalization, and polarization all impact significantly on conflict intensity. The latter two both tend to increase intensity levels. Religious legitimacy has a similar function in non-religious

conflict, but has no significant effect on religious conflict. Duration is significantly affected by religious discrimination, legitimacy, and polarization. Findings indicate that high rates of discrimination and polarization tend to prolong conflict. The effect from legitimacy changes over time. At first religious legitimacy tends to promote shorter conflicts, but after 234 days this effect is inverted. In sum, faith is important for conflict and six out of ten hypotheses are supported.

Finally, I will suggest some policy implications and future lines of research. Inasmuch as the results indicate that religious conflicts constitute the most violent and protracted cases, the termination of these is of utmost importance. Four policy implications will be proposed. First, all religious communities should be integrated into national politics and the dominance of one religious tradition over another should be hindered. This may reduce the probability of violent outbreak in the first place. Furthermore, it will arguably reduce the credible commitment problem as inter-religious dialogue on the political arena becomes institutionalized. Second, as results predict religious legitimacy to promote the termination of religious conflict in early phases, peace-promoting religious institutions and authorities should be brought forward and encourage belligerents to enter into negotiations. Religious leaders opposed to the violence could also be included as mediators and thus help to moderate warlords. This function is valuable in both religious and non-religious conflict, as religious legitimacy impacts on the latter as well. Third, non-political inter-religious institutions should be formalized in times of peace. In this manner tolerance across religious divides may be enhanced and in- and out-groups may become harder to establish. Similarly, it will be harder to demonize or dehumanize the others if formal ties exist between the groups. Finally, governments should refrain from discrimination, both religious and other. This is important in its own right, but also because discrimination tends to prolong violent conflict.

In order to develop our understanding of violent conflict and our ability to handle and end them, future research should approach the subject from new angles and with new perspectives. One approach is to perform analyses similar to those presented here using different data. For instance, studies can be based on other definitions of civil war, such as the COW definition. Similarly, other types of conflict – such as

interstate war, communal violence, and one-sided violence – should be analyzed. Is the relationship between religion and conflict consistent across conflict types? It is also of interest to scrutinize whether the effects found here are consistent across time and space.

Another approach is to develop new indicators. Mapping the relevance of religious issues to all conflicts since the end of World War II will enable us to obtain more detailed insight into conflict-dynamics. How do issue-based cleavages affect intensity and duration? How do identity-based cleavages affect issue-based ones? Do religious identity-divides predict religious issues to become more salient in armed conflict? Furthermore, it is of interest to map cleavages across other identity markers – such as ethnicity, language, regions, *et cetera* – in order to compare the effect of these with the effect of religious cleavages. A weakness of available data is the lack of local level indicators. In order to get a better grasp of the conditions belligerents actually operate under, local mapping of demography, legitimacy and other factors is recommended. Moreover, a better understanding of the credible commitment problem is offered if data on religious cleavages are coupled with indicators measuring the prevalence of negotiations, their rate of success, and the occurrence of recurring conflict. Are negotiations less successful when belligerents split along religious lines? When settlement is reached, is the risk of new onset greater where there is a religious cleavage? Data improvement could also allow us to control for duration in the intensity analysis and vice versa, thus providing more detailed results. Does the effect of intensity vary with duration time? Is duration contingent upon intensity levels?

Finally, available data should be used for other purposes. Data collected for this study could be used to examine differences between religious denominations. Do certain religious traditions fight especially bloody conflicts? Are some traditions more inclined to endure long-lasting conflicts than others? In sum, although this thesis has provided new insight into the religion-conflict nexus, much work remains for future studies.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Coding of Explanatory Variables

Country	Rebels	Active Years		Government	Rebel	Religious	Sources ^a	
		First	Last	Religion	Religion	Cleavage	Government	Rebels
<i>Afghanistan</i>	Various organizations	1978	2004	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, Adamec & Clements (2003)	Sve, Adamec & Clements (2003)
<i>Algeria</i>	MIA/FIS/AIS, GIA, GSPC	1991	2004	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, Helland-Hansen (2008)	Sve, ISVG
<i>Angola</i>	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R	1991	2004	None	Catholic	Yes	Dougherty (2007), GS	Sve, GS
	UNITA, FNLA, MPLA-faction	1975	2002	None	Protestant	Yes	Dougherty (2007), GS	Strømme (2008), HBE
<i>Argentina</i>	ERP, Montoneros	1973	1977	Catholic	Catholic	No	WCE (2001), W	Hodges (1976), EB
	Military faction	1963	1963	Catholic	Catholic	No	WCE (2001), W	WCE (2001), USb, Fox (2008), Roeder (2003)
	Military faction (José Domingo Molina Gómez)	1955	1955	Catholic	Catholic	No	WCE (2001), W	Time (1956), W
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	Husseinov military faction	1993	1993	Shi'ite	Shi'ite	No	Sve, USb	Sve
	OPON forces	1995	1995	Shi'ite	Shi'ite	No	Sve, USb	Sve
	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	1992	1994	Shi'ite	Orthodox	Yes	Sve, USb	Sve, USb
<i>Bangladesh</i>	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975	1997	Sunni	Theravada	Yes	Sve, WCE (2001), USb, Begovich (2007)	Sve, Talukdar (1994), Begovich (2007)
<i>Bolivia</i>	ELN	1967	1967	Catholic	None	Yes	WCE (2001), W	Malloy & Gamarra (1988), GS
	MNR	1952	1952			Missing		
	Popular Revolutionary Movement	1946	1946			Missing		
<i>Bosnia-Herzegovina</i>	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia	1993	1995	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, USb
	Croatian Rep. of Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993	1994	Sunni	Catholic	Yes	Sve, USb	Sve, USb
	Serb Rep. of Bosnia and H., Serb irregulars	1992	1995	Sunni	Orthodox	Yes	Sve, USb	Sve, USb
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	Popular Front	1987	1987	None	None	No	Enc, Markakis&Waller (1986), Wilkins (1989)	Enc, Wilkins (1989)
<i>Burundi</i>	Military faction (Police faction)	1965	1965	Catholic	Catholic	No	Misser (2003), Fox (2008)	Misser (2003), Fox (2008)
	Palipehutu, CNDD	1991	2004	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve, peoplegroups.org (2008)	Sve, peoplegroups.org (2008)
<i>Cambodia</i>	KR, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF	1978	1998	Theravada	Theravada	No	Lee (2007)	Kissi (2003), Poethig (2004), W
	KR, FUNK	1967	1975	Theravada	None	Yes	Lee (2007), WCE (2001)	Kissi (2003), Lee (2007)
<i>Cameroon</i>	Military faction (Ahidjo supporters)	1984	1984	Catholic	Sunni	Yes	Gros (1995), HBE, W	Gros (1995), HBE
<i>Central African Rep.</i>	Military faction, Forces of Francois Bozize	2001	2002	Animist	Other Christian	Yes	BBC (2008), Roeder (2003)	BBC(2008), UNHCR(2008), peoplegroups.org,Enc
<i>Chad</i>	MDD, FARF, MDJT	1997	2002	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, HBE	Sve
	Various groups	1965	1994	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, FRD, BBC (2008), Fox (2008), W	Sve, Fox(2008), W
<i>Chile</i>	Military faction (Pinochet)	1973	1973	None	Catholic	Yes	EB, CIA, WCE(2001), answers.com	BBC (2008), answers.com, brain-juice.com
<i>China</i>	Peoples Liberation Army	1946	1949	Other	None	Yes	WCE (2001), Eifring (2008)	Ye (2007), HBE
	Taiwanese insurgents	1947	1947	Other	Other	No	WCE (2001), Eifring (2008)	Eifring (2008)

	Tibet	1950	1959	None	Other Buddhist	Yes	WCE (2001), Ye (2007)	USb, buddhanet.net (2008)
<i>Colombia</i>	FARC , ELN , EPL , M-19	1966	2004	Catholic	None	Yes	Sve, WCE (2001)	ISVG, Kreutz (2007a)
<i>Comoros</i>	MPA/Republic of Anjouan	1997	1997	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, WCE (2001)	Sve, Anjouan Government (2008)
	Presidential guard (Denard)	1989	1989	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, WCE (2001)	Sve, Telegraph (2007)
<i>Congo</i>	Cobras, Ninjas	1993	1994	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve	Sve
	Cobras, Ninjas, Cocoyes, Ntsiloulous	1997	1999	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve	Sve
	Ntsiloulous	2002	2002	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve	Sve
<i>Congo, DR</i>	AFDL,RCD,RCD-ML,MLC,Rwanda,Uganda	1996	2001			Missing		
	CNL	1964	1965			Missing		
	FLNC	1977	1978			Missing		
	Independent Mining State of South Kasai	1960	1962			Missing		
	Katanga	1960	1962			Missing		
	Opposition militias	1967	1967			Missing		
<i>Costa Rica</i>	National Liberation Army	1948	1948			Missing		
<i>Croatia</i>	Serbian irregulars, Serbian Rep. of Krajina	1992	1995	Catholic	Orthodox	Yes	Sve, USb, WCE (2001), Fox(2008)	Sve, HBE, Roeder (2003)
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	MPCI, MJP, MPIGO, Forces Nouvelles	2002	2004	Catholic	Sunni	Yes	SVE, BBC (2008)	Sve, GS
<i>Cuba</i>	Forces of Fidel Castro	1953	1953			Missing		
	Movimiento 26 De Julio	1956	1958			Missing		
	National Revolutionary Council, USA	1961	1961	None	Other Christian	Yes	HBE, Infoplease (2008)	HBE, Fox(2008)
<i>Djibouti</i>	FRUD-faction	1999	1999	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb, HBE	Sve, Fox(2008)
	FRUD	1991	1994	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb, HBE	Sve, Fox(2008)
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	Military faction (Pro-Bosch forces)	1965	1965			Missing		
<i>Egypt</i>	al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya	1993	1998	Sunni	Shi'ite	Yes	Sve, WCE (2001)	Sve
<i>El Salvador</i>	ERP , FAL, FARN, FPL, PRTC, FMLN	1979	1991	Catholic	None	Yes	Sve, WCE (2001)	Rosenblum (2007), GS
	Military faction (Mejia)	1972	1972	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve, WCE (2001)	Kruijt (2008), W
<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>	Military faction (Obiang)	1979	1979	Catholic	Catholic	No	USb	Dictator of the Month (2005), W
<i>Eritrea</i>	EIJM	1997	2003	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, USb
<i>Ethiopia</i>	al-Itahad al-Islami (Somali)	1996	1999	Orthodox	Sunni	Yes	USb, W	Sve, USb
	ALF (Afar)	1989	1991	None	Sunni	Yes	Kissi (2003), WCE (2001)	Sve, USb
	ARDUF (Afar)	1996	1996	Orthodox	Sunni	Yes	USb, W	Sve, USb
	ELF , ELF-factions, EPLF	1962	1991	None	Sunni	Yes	Kissi (2003), WCE (2001)	Gilkes (1994), USb
	EPRP, TPLF , EPDM, OLF	1976	1991	None	Sunni	Yes	Kissi (2003), WCE (2001)	Sve
	Military faction (Imperial Guards)	1960	1960	Orthodox	Orthodox	No	WCE (2001), NM	Surlien (2008)
	OLF (Oromiya)	1989	2004	Orthodox	Sunni	Yes	USb, W	Sve, USb
	ONLF (Ogaden)	1996	2004	Orthodox	Sunni	Yes	USb, W	Sve, GS, HBE, Fox(2008)

	WSLF (Ogaden)	1976	1983	None	Sunni	Yes	Kissi (2003), WCE (2001)	HBE, Fox(2008), W
France	OAS	1961	1962	Catholic	Catholic	No	Fox (2008), USb	Fox(2008), USb, W
Gabon	Military faction (Hilaire-Aubame)	1964	1964	Catholic	Catholic	No	Enc, W	Reed (1987)
Gambia	SRLP	1981	1981	Sunni	None	Yes	USb, Roeder (2003)	UNHCR (2008), W
Georgia	Anti-government alliance, Zviadists	1991	1993	Orthodox	Orthodox	No	Sve, USb, WCE (2001)	Sve, answers.com
	Republic of Abkhazia	1992	1993	Orthodox	Orthodox	No	Sve, USb, WCE (2001)	Sve, W
	Republic of South Ossetia	1992	2004	Orthodox	Orthodox	No	Sve, USb, WCE (2001)	Sve, W
Ghana	Military faction (Jerry Rawlings)	1981	1983			Missing		
	Military faction (National Liberation Council)	1966	1966			Missing		
Greece	DSE	1946	1949			Missing		
Guatemala	Forces of Carlos Castillo Armas	1954	1954			Missing		
	Military faction	1949	1949			Missing		
	MR-13 , FAR , EGP , PGT , ORPA, URNG	1966	2004	Catholic	None	Yes	Sve, USb	Adams (1992), W
Guinea	Military faction	1970	1970			Missing		
	RFDG	2000	2001	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve
Guinea-Bissau	Junta for Consolid'n of Dem.,Peace&Justice	1998	1999	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve	Sve
Haiti	Leopard Corps	1989	1989			Missing		
	RARF, OP Lavalas	2004	2004			Missing		
	Tonton Macoute, Engine Lourde	1991	1991			Missing		
India	ABSU, NDFB (Bodoland)	1989	2004	Hindu	Other Christian	Yes	Sve, USb	Bhaumik (2004), GS
	ATTF, NLFT (Tripura)	1992	2004	Hindu	Protestant	Yes	Sve, USb	Sve, Fox(2008)
	CPI	1948	1951	Hindu	None	Yes	Sve, USb	Gleditsch <i>et al.</i> (forthcoming)
	CPI (-Marxist)	1967	1972	Hindu	None	Yes	Sve, USb	Gleditsch <i>et al.</i> (forthcoming)
	Kashmir insurgents	1989	2004	Hindu	Sunni	Yes	Sve, USb	ISVG, USb
	MNF (Mizoram)	1966	1968	Hindu	Protestant	Yes	Sve, USb	Fox(2008), Roeder (2003), USb, W
	NNC (Nagaland)	1956	1968	Hindu	Protestant	Yes	Sve, USb	Roeder (2003), USb
	NSCN (I-M) (Nagaland)	1992	2000	Hindu	Protestant	Yes	Sve, USb	Sve, Roeder (2003), USb
	PLA (Manipur)	1982	1988	Hindu	Hindu	No	Sve, USb	Sve, HBE
	PLA, UNLF (Manipur)	2003	2004	Hindu	Hindu	No	Sve, USb	Sve, HBE
	PLA, UNLF, KNF (Manipur)	1992	2000	Hindu	Hindu	No	Sve, USb	Sve, HBE
	PWG, MCC	1990	2004	Hindu	None	Yes	Sve, USb	UCDP, GS
	Sikh insurgents (Punjab/Khalistan)	1983	1993	Hindu	Sikh	Yes	Sve, USb	Gleditsch <i>et al.</i> (forthcoming), USb
	TNV (Tripura)	1978	1988	Hindu	Other Christian	Yes	Sve, USb	Adam <i>et al.</i> (2007), Fox(2008)
	ULFA (Assam)	1990	2004	Hindu	Hindu	Yes	Sve, USb	Sve, Roeder (2003)
Indonesia	Darul Islam Movement	1953	1953	Sunni	Sunni	No	USb, W	Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)

	Fretilin (East Timor)	1975	1998	Sunni	Catholic	Yes	Sve, USb, W	Sve, USb
	GAM (Aceh)	1990	2004	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, WCE (2001)	Sve, USb, Kingsbury (2007)
	OPM	1965	1978	Sunni	Other Christian	Yes	USb, W	Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)
	PRRI, Permesta mov't, Darul Islam Mov't	1958	1961	Sunni	Sunni	No	USb, W	Fox(2008), Roeder (2003), Törnquist (2008)
	Republic of South Moluccas	1950	1950	Sunni	Other Christian	Yes	USb, W	Glaudell (2007), GS
<i>Iran</i>	APCO (Arabistan)	1979	1980	Shi'ite	Sunni	Yes	Sve, USb, WCE (2001), W	USb, Roeder (2003)
	KDPI	1967	1996	Shi'ite	Sunni	Yes	Sve, USb, Stausberg (2008) WCE (2001), W	Sve, USb
	Mujahideen e Khalq	1979	2001	Shi'ite	Shi'ite	No	Sve, USb, WCE (2001), W	Sve
	Republic of Azerbaijan, Soviet Union	1946	1946	Shi'ite	Shi'ite	No	USb, Stausberg (2008), WCE (2001)	Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)
	Republic of Kurdistan/KDPI, Soviet Union	1946	1946	Shi'ite	Sunni	Yes	Sve, USb, Stausberg (2008)	Sve, USb
<i>Iraq</i>	Al Mahdi Army, Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna, TQJBR	2004	2004	Shi'ite	Shi'ite	No	The Iraq Foundation (2008), W	Sve, ISVG, GS
	KDP	1961	1970	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, Visser (2008), W	Sve, Roeder (2003), Fox(2008)
	KDP, PUK	1973	1993	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, Visser (2008), WCE (2001)	Sve, Roeder (2003), Fox(2008)
	Military faction	1963	1963			Missing		
	Military faction (Qassim)	1958	1958	Sunni	Sunni	No	Visser (2008)	Visser (2008), W
	Nationalists	1959	1959			Missing		
	PUK	1996	1996	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, WCE (2001)	Sve, Roeder (2003), Fox (2008)
	SCIRI	1982	1996	Sunni	Shi'ite	Yes	Sve, WCE (2001)	Sve, GS, W
<i>Israel</i>	Palestinian insurgents	1949	2004	Jewish	Sunni	Yes	Sve, BBC (2008)	USb, Roeder (2003), Fox (2008)
<i>Kenya</i>	Military faction (Ochuka)	1982	1982	Protestant	Catholic	Yes	Lonsdale (2008), W	Roeder (2003), W
<i>Korea, Republic of</i>	Leftist insurgents (Inmin-gun: mil. faction)	1948	1950	Protestant	None	Yes	The Pew Forum (2008), W	Minnich (2005), Woo (2007), W
<i>Laos</i>	LRM	1989	1990	None	Other Christian	Yes	WCE (2001), GS, HBE	Sve
	Pathet Lao, Neutrals	1959	1973	Theravada	None	Yes	USb, W	GS, HBE
<i>Lebanon</i>	Indep. Nasserite Mov't/Mourabitoun militia	1958	1958	Catholic	Sunni	Yes	UCDP, W	UCDP, W
	Leb. Army(Aoun), Leb. Forces, Syria, Israel	1975	1990	Sunni	Catholic	Yes	Sve, BBC (2008)	GS, Fox (2008), BBC (2008), W
<i>Lesotho</i>	Military faction	1998	1998	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve	Sve
<i>Liberia</i>	LURD	2000	2003	Protestant	Other Muslim	Yes	Ellis (1999), Fox(2008), HBE	GS, USa, W
	Military faction (Doe)	1980	1980	Other Christian	Animist	Yes	Ellis (1999), GS, W	Roeder (2003), NM
	NPFL, INPFL	1989	1995	Protestant	Other Christian	Yes	Fox(2008), NM, W	Ellis (1999), Fox(2008)
<i>Macedonia</i>	UCK	2001	2001	Orthodox	Sunni	Yes	Sve, USb, Fox(2008)	Sve, BBC (2008), Roeder (2003)
<i>Madagascar</i>	Monima National Independence Movement	1971	1971	Catholic	Catholic	No	Fox(2008), W	GS, FRD, Fox(2008)
<i>Malaysia</i>	CCO	1963	1966	Sunni	None	Yes	USb, WCE (2001)	van der Kroef (1966), UCDP
	CPM	1958	1981	Sunni	None	Yes	USb, WCE (2001)	Nathan (1990), UCDP
<i>Mali</i>	FIAA (Azawad)	1994	1994	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, UNHCR(2008), UCDP, Fox(2008), Roeder(2003)
	MPA (Azawad)	1990	1990	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, UCDP, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)

<i>Mexico</i>	EPR	1996	1996	Catholic	None	Yes	Sve, USb	ISVG, W
	EZLN	1994	1994	Catholic	None	Yes	Sve, USb	Krøvel (2008), McKinley (2006)
<i>Moldova</i>	Dniestr Republic	1992	1992	Orthodox	Orthodox	No	Sve, USb	Sve, Fox(2008), W
<i>Morocco</i>	Military faction (Ababou)	1971	1971	Sunni	Sunni	No	WCE (2001), USb	WCE (2001), USb, Fox (2008), Roeder (2003)
	POLISARIO	1975	1989	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb, WCE (2001)	Sve, USb
<i>Mozambique</i>	Renamo	1977	1992	None	Catholic	Yes	Vines (1996), WCE (2001), EB, UCDP	Vines (1996), W
<i>Muscat and Oman</i>	State of Oman/Free Oman	1957	1957	Other Muslim	Other Muslim	No	FRD, BBC (2008), HBE, W	GS, FRD, BBC (2008), HBE, W
<i>Myanmar</i>	ABSDF	1991	1994	Theravada	Theravada	No	Sve, USb, W	Sve, Roeder (2003)
	Arakan insurgents	1948	1988	Theravada	Theravada	No	USb, Tallentire (2007), W	USb, W
	ARIF, RSO (Arakan)	1991	1994	Theravada	Sunni	Yes	Sve, USb, W	Sve, Fox (2008), Landinfo (2008)
	BCP, leftist organizations	1948	1988	Theravada	None	Yes	USb, Tallentire (2007), W	Kreutz (2007b), UCDP
	BMA	1996	1996	Theravada	Theravada	No	Sve, USb	Sve, USb
	KIO (Kachin)	1961	1992	Theravada	Other Christian	Yes	USb, Tallentire (2007), W	Sve, USb, Kreutz (2007b)
	KNPP (Karenni)	1957	1996	Theravada	Protestant	Yes	Sve, USb, W	Sve, USb
	KNU	1949	1992	Theravada	Other Christian	Yes	Sve, USb, Tallentire (2007), W	Sve, USb
	KNU, God's Army (Karen)	1995	2003	Theravada	Other Christian	Yes	Sve, USb	Sve, USb
	MTA, SSA/s	1993	2002	Theravada	Theravada	No	Sve, USb	Sve, USb
	NMSP	1990	1990	Theravada	Theravada	No	Sve, USb, W	Sve, USb
	PNDF (Kachin)	1949	1949	Theravada	Other Christian	Yes	USb, W	USb, W
	SSA, SSIA	1959	1970	Theravada	Theravada	No	Sve, USb, Tallentire (2007), W	USb, W
	SSNPLO, SSRA, PSLO, MTA	1976	1988	Theravada	Theravada	No	Sve, USb, Tallentire (2007)	USb, W
	UWSA (Wa)	1997	1997	Theravada	Theravada	No	Sve, USb	Sve
	Various insurgents (Mon)	1948	1963	Theravada	Theravada	No	Sve, USb, Tallentire (2007), W	USb, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)
<i>Nepal</i>	CPN-M/UPF	1996	2004	Hindu	None	Yes	Sve, WCE (2001)	ISVG, UCDP
	Nepali Congress	1960	1962	Hindu	Hindu	No	Sve, WCE (2001), USb	BBC (2008), W
<i>Nicaragua</i>	Contras/FDN	1981	1989	None	Catholic	Yes	Bugajski (1990), FRD	Sve, W
	FSLN	1978	1979	Catholic	None	Yes	WCE(2001), Fox(2008), Roeder(2003), NM, W	Bugajski (1990), GS, HBE
<i>Niger</i>	FDR, FARS	1996	1997	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)
	FLAA, CRA	1992	1994	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)
	UFRA	1997	1997	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)
<i>Nigeria</i>	Ahlul Sunna Jamma	2004	2004	Other Christian	Sunni	Yes	BBC (2008), W	GS, UNHCR (2008), USb
	Military faction	1966	1966	Catholic	Sunni	Yes	USb, W	Fox(2008), W
	Republic of Biafra	1967	1970			Missing		
<i>Oman</i>	PFLOAG/PFLO	1972	1975	Other Muslim	None	Yes	WCE (2001), W	HBE, W
<i>Pakistan</i>	Baluchi separatists	1974	1977	Sunni	Sunni	No	USb, WCE (2001), W	Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)

	MQM	1990	1996	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb, WCE (2001)	Sve, Fox(2008)
	Mukti Bahini (East Pakistan)	1971	1971	Shi'ite	Shi'ite	No	USb, WCE (2001), W	Fox(2008), USb
<i>Panama</i>	Military faction (Noriega)	1989	1989	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve, USb, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)	Sve, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003), W
<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	BRA (Bougainville)	1989	1996	Other Christian	Other Christian	No	Sve, Fox(2008)	Sve, Fox(2008)
<i>Paraguay</i>	Military faction (Rodriguez)	1989	1989	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve, WCE (2001), USb	Sve
	Military faction (Stroessner)	1954	1954			Missing		
	Oppo.coal.(Febreristas,Liberals,Communists)	1947	1947			Missing		
<i>Peru</i>	MIR, T-pac Amaru, ELN	1965	1966	Catholic	None	Yes	USb, W	FRD, W
	Sendero Luminoso, MRTA	1982	1999	Catholic	None	Yes	Sve, USb	FRD, W
<i>Philippines</i>	ASG, MILF (Mindanao)	1994	2004	Catholic	Sunni	Yes	Sve, USb	Sve, Cruz Manacsa & Tan (2007), USb
	CPP, Military faction	1972	2004	Catholic	None	Yes	Sve, USb, W	Cruz Manacsa & Tan (2007)
	HUK	1946	1954	Catholic	None	Yes	USb, W	onwar.com (2008), W
	MNLF, MILF (Mindanao)	1970	1990	Catholic	Sunni	Yes	Sve, USb, W	Sve, Cruz Manacsa & Tan (2007), USb
<i>Romania</i>	National Salvation Front	1989	1989	None	Orthodox	Yes	UCDP, HBE	Sve, Roeder (2003)
<i>Russia</i>	Parliamentary forces	1993	1993	Orthodox	Orthodox	No	Sve, WCE (2001), Guardian, W	Sve, Roeder (2003)
	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)	1994	2004	Orthodox	Sunni	Yes	Sve, WCE (2001), Guardian, W	Sve, Karaman(2007), Fox(2008), Roeder(2003), W
	Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district	1999	1999	Orthodox	Sunni	Yes	Sve, WCE (2001), Guardian, W	Sve, HBE
<i>Rwanda</i>	FDLR	1997	2004	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve, USb, W	Sve, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)
	FPR	1990	1994	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve, USb	Sve, Fox(2008), Roeder (2003)
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	Juhayman Movement	1979	1979	Sunni	Sunni	No	USb, WCE (2001)	UCDP, W
<i>Senegal</i>	MFDC (Casamance)	1990	2003	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, Roeder (2003)
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	RUF, AFRC, Kamajors	1991	2000	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, Boås (2008)	Sve
<i>Somalia</i>	Military faction (Shaykh Usmaan)	1978	1978	Sunni	Sunni	No	USb, Roeder (2003), W	USb, Roeder (2003), W
	SNM, SPM, USC, SSDF, USC-faction	1981	1996	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb, Roeder (2003)	Sve, USb, Roeder (2003)
	SRRC	2001	2002	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb, Roeder (2003)	Sve, USb, Roeder (2003)
<i>South Africa</i>	ANC, PAC, Azapo	1981	1988	Protestant	Other Christian	Yes	FRD	Fox (2008)
	SWAPO	1966	1988	Protestant	Protestant	No	FRD	USb, W
<i>Soviet Union</i>	Azerbaijani Popular Front	1990	1990	None	Shi'ite	Yes	WCE (2001), EB, Infoplease (2008), W	Sve, USb, Fox (2008)
	BDPS (Lithuania)	1946	1948	None	Catholic	Yes	WCE (2001), EB, Infoplease (2008), W	USb, Roeder (2003)
	Forest Brothers (Estonia)	1946	1948	None	Protestant	Yes	WCE (2001), EB, Infoplease (2008), W	USb, Fox (2008), Roeder (2003)
	LTS(p)A, LNJS, LNPA (Latvia)	1946	1947	None	Protestant	Yes	WCE (2001), EB, Infoplease (2008), W	Fox (2008), Roeder (2003)
	Republic of Armenia, ANM	1990	1991	None	Other Christian	Yes	WCE (2001), EB, Infoplease (2008), W	USb, Roeder (2003)
	UPA (Ukraine)	1946	1950	None	Orthodox	Yes	WCE (2001), EB, Infoplease (2008), W	USb, Roeder (2003)
<i>Spain</i>	ETA	1980	1992	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve, USb, WCE (2001)	Sve, Reinares (2008)
<i>Sri Lanka</i>	JVP	1971	1990	Theravada	Theravada	No	USb, Frydenlund(2008), H&J, WCE(2001)	Frydenlund (2008), FRD

<i>Sudan</i>	LTTE, TELO, PLOTE	1983	2003	Theravada	Hindu	Yes	USb, Frydenlund(2008), H&J, WCE(2001)	Sve, H&J, W
	Anya Nya/SSLM	1963	1972	Sunni	Animist	Yes	Thyne (2007), USb	Thyne(2007), South Sudan Resistance (1971)
	Islamic Charter Front	1976	1976	Sunni	Sunni	No	Thyne (2007), USb	Gleditsch <i>et al.</i> (forthcoming), USb
	SLM/A, JEM	2003	2004	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, Haynes (2007)	Sve
	SPLM, SPLM-faction, SAF, NDA	1983	2004	Sunni	Other Christian	Yes	Sve, Haynes (2007), Thyne (2007)	Sve
<i>Suriname</i>	Sudanese Communist Party	1971	1971	Sunni	None	Yes	Thyne (2007)	Gleditsch <i>et al.</i> (forthcoming)
	SLA/Jungle Commando	1986	1988	Other Christian	Animist	Yes	USb, W	USb, W
<i>Syria</i>	Military faction (Jadid)	1966	1966	Sunni	Shi'ite	Yes	WCE (2001), USb, W	GS, LookLex (2008), W
	Muslim Brotherhood	1979	1982	Sunni	Sunni	No	WCE (2001), USb, W	Lia (2006), W
<i>Tajikistan</i>	UTO, Movement for Peace in Tajikistan	1992	1998	Sunni	Sunni	No	Sve, USb	Sve, HBE
<i>Thailand</i>	CPT	1974	1982	Theravada	None	Yes	WCE (2001), USb, W	UCDP, onwar.com (2008)
	Military faction (Navy)	1951	1951	Theravada	Theravada	No	WCE (2001), USb, W	USb, Fox (2008), Roeder (2003)
<i>Togo</i>	Military faction (Supporters of Eyadema)	1991	1991	Other	Other	No	Sve	Sve
	MTD	1986	1986			Missing		
<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>	Jamaat al-Muslimeen	1990	1990	Catholic	Sunni	Yes	Sve	Sve
<i>Tunisia</i>	Resistance Armeé Tunisienne	1980	1980			Missing		
<i>Turkey</i>	Devrimci Sol	1991	1992	Sunni	None	Yes	Sve, USb, W	UCDP, HBE, W
	PKK/Kadok/KONGRA-GEL	1984	2004	Sunni	None	Yes	Sve, USb, W	Finn (2007), HBE
<i>Uganda</i>	Military faction	1971	1971			Missing		
	UPA	1972	1972			Missing		
	Various insurgents	1974	2004			Missing		
<i>United Kingdom</i>	PIRA	1971	1991	Protestant	Catholic	Yes	Sve	Sve
	Real IRA	1998	1998	Protestant	Catholic	Yes	Sve	Sve
<i>Uruguay</i>	MLN/Tuparnaros	1972	1972			Missing		
<i>Uzbekistan</i>	IMU	2000	2000	Shi'ite	Shi'ite	No	Sve	Sve
	JIG	2004	2004	Shi'ite	Sunni	Yes	Sve	USb, Fox (2008), Roeder (2003)
<i>Venezuela</i>	Military faction (Chávez)	1992	1992	Catholic	Catholic	No	Sve	Sve
	Military faction (leftist faction)	1962	1962	Catholic	None	Yes	WCE (2001), W	Althouse (2004)
<i>Vietnam, Republic of</i>	FNL	1955	1964	Catholic	None	Yes	HBE, W	UCDP, W
<i>Yemen</i>	Democratic Republic of Yemen	1994	1994	Sunni	None	Yes	WCE (2001), USb	UCDP, W
<i>Yemen, Arab Rep.</i>	National Democratic Front	1980	1982	Sunni	None	Yes	WCE (1982)	EB, W
	Opposition coalition	1948	1948			Missing		
	Royalists	1962	1970	Sunni	Shi'ite	Yes	WCE (1982), Corstange (2007)	Corstange (2007)
<i>Yemen, People's Rep.</i>	Faction of Yemenite Socialist Party	1986	1986	None	None	No	UCDP, WCE (1982)	UCDP, WCE (1982)
<i>Yugoslavia (Serbia)</i>	Republic of Croatia, Croatian irregulars	1991	1991	Orthodox	Catholic	Yes	Sve, Roeder (2003)	Sve, Fox (2008), Roeder (2003)

	Republic of Slovenia	1991	1991	Orthodox	Catholic	Yes	Sve, Roeder (2003)	Sve, Roeder (2003)
	UCK	1998	1999	Orthodox	Other Muslim	Yes	Sve, Roeder (2003)	Sve, Fox (2008)
Zimbabwe	ZANU, ZAPU	1972	1979	Other Christian	Other Christian	No	Fox (2008)	Fox (2008)

^a Listed abbreviations refer to the following sources: CIA=Central Intelligence Agency (2008); EB=Encyclopædia Britannica Online (2008); Enc=Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia (2008); FRD=Federal Research Division (2008); GS=GlobalSecurity.org (2008); H&J=Horowitz & Jayamaha (2007); HBE=HighBeam Encyclopedia (2008); ISVG=Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (2008); NM=NationMaster.com (2008); Sve=Svensson (2007); UCDP=Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2008); USa=U.S. Department of State (2008a); USb=U.S. Department of State (2008b); W=Wikipedia: the Free Encyclopedia (2008); WCE (1982)=Barrett (1982); WCE (2001)=Barrett et al. (2001).

Appendix B: Changes in religious discrimination from 1990 to 2002

